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Explore Tax-Free Wealth Growth Through Private Placement Life Insurance

Welcome to our in-depth exploration of Private Placement Life Insurance (PPLI), a sophisticated financial tool designed to help high-net-worth individuals achieve tax-free compounding growth. In this webinar, hosted by Peak Trust Company, you’ll hear from experts Jonathan Blattmachr, William Lipkind, and Matthew Blattmachr as they dive deep into the nuances and advantages of PPLI as part of estate and wealth planning.

If you’re considering PPLI for yourself or your clients, this comprehensive webinar will equip you with the knowledge to make informed decisions. Watch now to explore how PPLI can be a powerful tool in your wealth preservation and tax planning strategy.

 

 
What You Will Learn
This webinar offers an extensive look at the structure, benefits, and risk factors
associated with PPLI, providing insights into:

  • The Fundamentals of PPLI: Discover the basics of life insurance taxation, how
    cash value grows without taxation, and the potential asset protection benefits
    PPLI offers.
  • Comparing Variable Life Insurance: Learn how variable products, as
    securities, differ from traditional insurance, offering more customization and
    flexibility in terms of investment strategies.
  • Utilizing PPLI: Understand how to leverage PPLI for investing in different types
    of assets, from marketable securities to private investments, while managing the
    associated risks.
  • Key Risk Factors: Explore the tax risks of failing to meet statutory requirements
    and learn about owner control issues, diversification rules, and more.
  • Pragmatic Considerations: Get practical advice on eligibility, the importance of
    appraisals, and strategies to maximize the benefits of PPLI while navigating the
    complexities of compliance.
  • Federal Legislation:The webinar also covers current and potential federal legislation that could
    impact the future of PPLI, giving you critical insight into why acting now may be
    advantageous.

Some Income Tax Aspects of Variable Life Insurance Policies

by William D. Lipkind and Jonathan G. Blattmachr

A version of this paper was originally published in the February 2015 Journal of Taxation.

Introduction

This article will discuss some of the income tax aspects of what are called “variable” life insurance contracts. Some provisions are straight forward. However, others are not just complicated but finding the correct result is like walking through a maze.

Fortunately, all but one of them can be negotiated with a relatively certain end result. Nonetheless, one rule the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS” or “Service”) has attempted to create, called the “investor control” doctrine, is uncertain in scope and effect.

Life Insurance: Why It Seems Mysterious but Isn’t
Many people have strong views about life insurance1 but a reasonable observation seems to be that it is probably the least understood financial product that is widely held. The peculiar structures of so-called “cash value” policies (more fully described below) that combine both a risk of death payment component and an investment component are especially confusing to many.

All investments involve some type of gambling—that a purchased stock or parcel of land will go up in value or that a bond will make the regular interest payments and will be paid in full upon maturity. In some senses, pure life insurance (sometimes, called “term insurance” but known in the insurance industry as the “net amount at risk”2) is a gamble as to when the insured will die and the death benefit paid. Obviously, the longer the insured lives, the lower the return on the premiums paid will be.3 In any event, all forms of insurance, including life insurance, typically involve risk shifting and risk distribution.


“Not only is life insurance a unique form of financial product, it is also treated uniquely or at least in a different manner than other such products are for certain legal or regulatory purposes.”


However, unlike virtually all other types of insurance, life products, as indicated above, commonly have an additional feature or component: an investment component, commonly called the “cash value” account.4 This additional feature is critical, for many life products, to maintain the payment of coverage at death at advanced ages. The reason is that the cost of the pure life insurance component (the net amount at risk) increases every year with the insured’s increasing age, becoming extremely great at advanced ages. By coupling the pure risk component (which typically declines at least at certain ages by design of the product or by choice of the owner if the owner is looking to maximize the cash value) with the cash value account (anticipated to grow in value), the death benefit may be maintained at a fixed or at least at a minimum level. Many products are designed so the net amount at risk declines, dollar for dollar, for increases in the investment component (commonly call the “cash value” account) and the death benefit, which will consist of the remaining “net amount at risk” and the investment (cash value) component, will remain constant.5 With a variable (universal) policy, “the cash value can be invested in a wide variety of separate accounts, similar to mutual funds, and the choice of which of the available separate accounts to use is entirely up to the contract owner. The ‘variable’ component in the name refers to this ability to invest in separate accounts whose values vary—they vary because they are invested in stock and/or bond markets. The ‘universal’ component in the name refers to the flexibility the owner has in making premium payments.”6

Unique Treatment under the Law
Not only is life insurance a unique form of financial product, it is also treated uniquely or at least in a different manner than other such products are for certain legal or regulatory purposes. For example, the regulation of pure term policies is governed almost exclusively by state rather than Federal law.7 If the cash value component of the life policy varies with investment experience, then that component is regulated under Federal law by the Securities & Exchange Commission.


“Under the law of most states, an owner’s interest in a policy of life insurance (including the cash value component) may be exempted from claims of the owner’s creditors.”


Under the law of most states, an owner’s interest in a policy of life insurance (including the cash value component) may be exempted from claims of the owner’s creditors.8 Also, usually, the death benefit paid is not subject to the claims of creditors of the insured or his or her estate (unless paid to the insured’s estate).9

Life insurance products and insurance companies are uniquely treated, to a significant degree, under the Internal Revenue Code. The taxation of insurers is under Subchapter L of the Code (entitled “Insurance Companies” with Part I dealing specifically with “Life Insurance Companies”).

The inclusion of life insurance proceeds in the gross estate of the insured for Federal estate tax purposes is dealt with under Section 2042 (which applies to no other asset).10 Even the allowance of an annual exclusion for the payment of premiums on a life policy owned by a trust has been specially developed.11

Special Treatment for Income Tax Purposes

Except to the extent the Code has a specific rule to the contrary (as it does for interests in certain retirement plans and accounts, grantor trusts and zero coupon bonds12) and except where the income has been actually received, the determination of when a taxpayer must report an item in gross income turns on the doctrine of “constructive receipt.”

Treas. Reg. 1.451-2(a) sets forth the doctrine as follows:

“Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer’s possession is constructively received by him in the taxable year during which it is credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available so that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that he could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of intention to withdraw had been given. However, income is not constructively received if the taxpayer’s control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions.”

In fact, the timing of taxation of the growth in cash value in or receipt of income by a policy of life insurance apparently is based upon the doctrine. In what may be viewed as a seminal case, Cohen v. Commissioner, 39 TC 1055 (1963), to which the Commissioner has acquiesced13, the United States Tax Court stated, in part and in conclusion, “[W]e hold that the petitioner’s right to receive the cash surrender value including periodic increments thereof was subject to such ‘substantial restrictions’ as to make inapplicable the doctrine of constructive receipt. Petitioner would have been required to surrender his entire investment in the policies in order to realize that income.”

Hence, the investment (or cash value) component in the life policy would grow tax free and the receipt of that component at death as a death benefit was (and is) excludible as a general rule from gross income.14

Moreover, until the adoption in 1988 of Section 7702A (and amendments to Section 72) relating to modified endowment contracts (“MECs”), discussed below, the owner of the policy could make a partial surrender of a life policy or borrow from the policy’s cash value without being treated as having received any gross income, even if the cash value exceeded the sum of premiums paid (investment in the contract).

Meaning of Life Insurance for Tax Purposes
Until the enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (“1984 Act”), the Code did not have a definition of life insurance although it had many specific rules dealing with tax matters relating to life insurance, such as the exclusion from gross income of the receipt of proceeds payable by reason of the death of the insured.15 In order to obtain the benefits of income tax-free growth in the cash (or investment) value of a policy and to receive that growth income tax-free at death, all the contract had to be was life insurance under applicable law. As a consequence, many policies were sold to provide those tax benefits with minimal shifting of risk attributable to the death of the insured.

However, the 1984 Act added Section 7702(a) to the Code to provide a definition which a life policy had to meet so that the growth on or income earned on the investment or cash value component of the policy (such growth or income commonly called the “inside buildup”) would not be subject to income tax when earned “inside” the policy. Under that definition, a contract is a life insurance policy so the growth or income on its cash value is not subject to income tax when earned only if it is a life insurance contract under applicable law16 and it meets either (1) a certain cash (investment) value accumulation test or (2) a guideline premium test and falls within a certain cash value corridor, all as set forth in Section 7702(a).

Consequence If the Contract Does Meet the Definition
Section 7702(g) specifies the tax consequences if the contract is a life insurance policy under applicable law but does not meet either the cash value accumulation or the guideline premium test under Section 7702(a).17 Section 7702(g) provides that, in such a case, the income on the contract for any taxable year of the policyholder is treated as ordinary income received or accrued by the policyholder during such year. However, essentially, the amount of income is limited to the increase in the net (cash) surrender value18 of the contract during the taxable year19 plus the cost of pure life insurance protection (the net amount at risk) provided under the contract during the taxable year over the premiums paid under the contract during the taxable year. This seems to mean that the owner of the contract must include in gross income the increase in net surrender value and the cost of any term component essentially paid by the cash value component of the policy. Income taxation under Section 7702(g) does not turn on any borrowing or withdrawal—it is based solely on the annual increase in net surrender value (and the annual cost of the premiums paid by the policy’s cash value), over premiums paid for the year, and does not seem to be based upon any notion of constructive receipt.20


“Not only is life insurance a unique form of financial product, it is also treated uniquely or at least in a different manner than other such products are for certain legal or regulatory purposes.”


Section 7702(g) goes on to provide that, with respect to any contract, which is a life insurance contract under the applicable law but does not meet the definition of life insurance contract under subsection (a), the excess of the amount paid by reason of the death of the insured over the net surrender value of the contract is deemed to be paid under a life insurance contract for purposes of Section 10121 (meaning, as a general rule, that the proceeds are not includible in gross income) and, essentially, will be treated as insurance for estate and gift tax purposes.22

Therefore, if a contract is a policy of life insurance under applicable law but does not meet the definition of a life insurance policy under Section 7702(a) but never had an increase in net surrender value23, any growth in cash value (even if gross cash surrender value has increased) will be subject to income tax during the lifetime of the insured or at his or her death (although, to the extent, the cash value is used annually to pay term premiums inside the policy it will be included in gross income for such year24).

Modified Endowment Contract Rules
Despite the enactment of a statutory definition of life insurance, life insurance policies that met the definition could produce significant income tax benefits by avoiding taxation of growth in the cash value component of a policy and permitting that income to be accessed, in certain ways, such as by a partial surrender or by borrowing, income tax free.

Those benefits are discussed in the legislative history (“TAMRA Conference Report”25) to the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (“TAMRA”) that states, in part, that “the undistributed investment income (sometimes called the ‘inside buildup’) earned on premiums credited under a contract that satisfied a statutory definition of life insurance is not subject to current taxation to the owner of the contract. *** Amounts received under a life insurance contract prior to the death of the insured generally are not includible in gross income to the extent that the amount received does not exceed the taxpayer’s investment in the contract. Amounts borrowed under a life insurance contract generally are not treated as received and, consequently, are not includible in gross income.26 (Emphasis added.)

To curb some of these benefits for policies that met the definition of life insurance under Section 7702(a), TAMRA added a new rule for life insurance policies that the Act defined as “modified endowment contracts,” under new Section 7702A, which is any contract that “satisfies the present-law definition of a life insurance contract but fails to satisfy a 7-pay test.”27 (Emphasis added.) Under that new law enacted as part of the Act, “amounts received under modified endowment contracts are treated first as income and then as recovered basis. In addition, loans under modified endowment contracts and loans secured by modified endowment contracts are treated as amounts received under the contract.”28

Therefore, the increase in the investment component (the inside buildup) of a policy that meets the definition of a life insurance policy under Section 7702(a) (that is, one that is a life policy under applicable law and meets either (1) a certain cash value accumulation test or (2) a guideline premium test and falls within a certain cash value corridor) is not currently taxed but, if the premiums are withdrawn (such as by a partial surrender) or borrowing against the cash value occurs, the inside build up is taxed, to the extent of the surrender or borrowing, under Section 72 if the policy is a modified endowment contract (a “MEC”).

Technically, this occurred by changes made to the Code by TAMRA Section 5012(c), which added Section 7702A which provides a definition of a modified endowment contract and made amendments to Section 72(e) to cause partial surrenders of a MEC or borrowing against the cash value of a MEC to be included in gross income. (Partial surrenders or borrowing against cash value of a policy that is not a MEC continue to be income tax free.)

More on the Definition and Treatment of a Modified Endowment Contract

Section 7702A, as indicated, contains the definition of a modified endowment contract as “any contract meeting the requirements of section 7702…which…fails to meet the 7-pay test of subsection (b).” (Emphasis added.) Quite apparently, this means a contract meeting the definition of a life insurance contract under Section 7702(a) that fails to meet the 7-pay test as suggested by the emphasized portions of the Conference Report quoted above. Although no regulation has been issued discussing the definition of modified endowment contracts, it seems quite certain, for the reasons set forth immediately below, that it includes only contracts that meet the definition of a life policy under Section 7702(a) and not one dealt with under Section 7702(g), which would be one that does not meet that definition.

First, as noted, the TAMRA Conference Report certainly must be referring only to insurance policies defined in Section 7702(a) by referring to “the present-law definition of a life insurance contract.” Indeed, there is no other definition of a life insurance contract in the Code other than in Section 7702(a).

Second, Section 7702A refers only to a contract that meets the “requirements” of Section 7702 and only Section 7702(a) has requirements. Section 7702(g) does not contain requirements. It deals with the “Treatment of [a contract] which…[is a] life insurance contract under the applicable law [but] does not meet the definition of life insurance contract under subsection (a).” Hence, all that Section 7702(g) does is provide the income tax treatment of a contract that does not meet the tax definition of life insurance under Section 7702(a); Section 7702(g) provides no “requirements” at all.

Third, as described above, Section 7702(g) eliminates the income tax free buildup in investment value and provides that such buildup is taxed to the policy owner each year but it limits the amount of gross income to the annual increase in the net surrender value (and the cost of term insurance essentially paid by the cash value). Because the owner of a policy that does not meet the Section 7702(a) definition is taxed currently on increases to the net surrender value and cannot withdraw or borrow the account value to the extent it exceeds the net surrender value, there would seem to be no need to have a contract that does not meet the definition of life insurance under Section 7702(a) fall under the tax treatment of modified endowment contracts under Section 7702A and Section 72. Section 72 essentially provides that any withdrawal of premium or borrowing of cash value from a MEC is first treated as income earned on the cash value before being treated as a tax free return of premium (investment).

The definition of a modified endowment contract, as stated, is under Section 7702A and its taxation is governed by Section 72(e). TAMRA added the definition of a MEC and provided for partial surrenders and borrowings against the cash value of a MEC to be included in gross income. Prior to the TAMRA changes, Section 72(e) essentially provided that partial surrenders and borrowings against the cash value of a life policy were not included in gross income. Prior to the TAMRA changes, Section 72(e) essentially provided that partial surrenders and borrowings against the cash value of a life policy were not included in gross income. However, under TAMRA, beginning in 1988, such surrenders and borrowing are included in gross income if the policy is a MEC. The reason is that Section 72 provides rules with respect to amounts received as an annuity under an annuity or life insurance contract and to amounts not received as an annuity.29 Section 72(e)(2)(B) essentially provides that any amount received before the annuity starting date of the contract is included in gross income to the extent it is deemed to consist of income earned in the contract but not to the extent it exceeds the investment in the contract—and the amount received before the annuity starting date is deemed to consist of the income earned through that time. Section 72(e)(3) essentially provides that this profit is the amount by which the cash value (determined without regard to any surrender charge) exceeds the investment in the contract (essentially premiums paid). Section 72(e)(4)(A) basically provides that amounts received as a loan under a policy fall under the income inclusion rule of Section 72(e)(2)(B). So, up to this point, there is an indication that any amount received under any policy to the extent of gross cash value over premiums paid is included in gross income.

However, under TAMRA, beginning in 1988, such surrenders and borrowing are included in gross income if the policy is a MEC. The reason is that Section 72 provides rules with respect to amounts received as an annuity under an annuity or life insurance contract and to amounts not received as an annuity.29 Section 72(e)(2)(B) essentially provides that any amount received before the annuity starting date of the contract is included in gross income to the extent it is deemed to consist of income earned in the contract but not to the extent it exceeds the investment in the contract—and the amount received before the annuity starting date is deemed to consist of the income earned through that time. Section 72(e)(3) essentially provides that this profit is the amount by which the cash value (determined without regard to any surrender charge) exceeds the investment in the contract (essentially premiums paid). Section 72(e)(4)(A) basically provides that amounts received as a loan under a policy fall under the income inclusion rule of Section 72(e)(2)(B). So, up to this point, there is an indication that any amount received under any policy to the extent of gross cash value over premiums paid is included in gross income. However, Section 72(e)(5)(A) and (C) basically together provide that Section 72(e)(2)(B) and Section 72(e)(4)(A), which in essence cause partial surrenders and borrowings (up to gross cash value above premiums paid) to be included in gross income, do not apply to non-annuity payments under a life policy with the exception, added by TAMRA, for modified endowment contracts. In other words, these rather complexly weaved provisions of Section 72 provide that partial surrenders or borrowings from a life insurance policy are included in gross income only if the policy is a MEC.

Comparison of Taxation under Section 7702(g) and Taxation of MECs

It will be noted that the treatment of a modified endowment contract generally is more beneficial under Sections 7702A and 72 than the treatment prescribed for policies the taxation of which is governed by Section 7702(g): the owner can avoid any taxation of the inside buildup for a modified endowment contract merely by not surrendering or borrowing; but the taxation of the inside buildup of a policy that is not described in Section 7702(a) and, therefore, whose treatment is prescribed by Section 7702(g), cannot be avoided, except that it is limited to “the increase in the net surrender value of the contract during the taxable year, and the cost of life insurance protection provided under the contract during the taxable year” over premiums paid that year. (Emphasis added.) Hence, it seems there would be no reason for the definition of a modified endowment contract to include one that is not described in Section 7702(a).30 This is borne out by the words of Section 7702A and the legislative history of the TAMRA by which that section was added to the Code.

However, there may be one circumstance in which a policy not meeting the definition of life insurance under Section 7702(a) may fare better than a modified endowment contract. That is the case where the amount borrowed from a MEC is included in gross income is greater than the total increases in net surrender value of a policy the income taxation of which is determined under Section 7702(g) whether borrowing from the latter policy occurs or not (which borrowing, of course, could never exceed net surrender value). As mentioned above, a modified endowment contract is taxed under Section 72.31 Section 72(e)(2)(B) provides, in effect, that distributions under the contract shall be included in gross income to the extent allocable to income on the contract, and shall not be included in gross income to the extent allocable to the investment in the contract. Section 72(e) (2)(C) provides that the amount allocable to income is limited to the “cash value of the contract (determined without regard to any surrender charge) immediately before the amount is received, over … the investment in the contract at such time.” (Emphasis added.) Hence, an increase in cash value of a modified endowment contract will be included in gross income (to the extent of a withdrawal or borrowing) even to the extent there is a cash surrender charge (by which cash surrender value is reduced to net surrender value).32 For a policy not described in Section 7702(a), the inside buildup is taxed (annually without regard to any surrender or withdrawal) only to the extent there is no surrender charge. See, in particular, Section 72(e)(5) which retains prior law treatment of distributions (presumably, including borrowings) that are not annuity payments from a policy except for modified endowment contracts.

It seems relatively certain that borrowing against a policy that is not described in Section 7702(a) (that is, one that is not a modified endowment contract) does not result in income tax inclusion although any increase in net surrender value each year would.

A Little More on Surrender Value
As noted above, Section 7702(g) expressly provides that, if the policy does not fall under the definition under Section 7702(a), the annual increase in the net surrender value is included in the owner’s gross income. It seems reasonably certain that net surrender value is the gross cash surrender value reduced by what would be the actual surrender charges imposed upon the surrender of the policy. However, as noted, Section 72(e)(2)(C) provides that the amount allocable to income is limited to the “cash value of the contract (determined without regard to any surrender charge) immediately before the amount is received, over … the investment in the contract at such time.” (Emphasis added.)

These two provisions are not inconsistent. They simply fall under different rules. The latter (Section 72(e)(2)(C)) deals only with a modified endowment contract, which as explained is one that meets the definition of a life insurance policy under Section 7702(a) and does not comply with the so-called seven pay test set forth in Section 7702A. Hence, any owner of a modified endowment contract who borrows cash from the policy or does a partial surrender of the policy for cash must include the cash in gross income to the extent of gross cash value (but only to the extent it exceeds premiums paid). In contrast, Section 7702(g), dealing with policies that do not meet the definition of a life insurance policy under Section 7702(a), limits the amount the owner must include in gross income to annual increases in value—and this increase must be included in gross income even if not withdrawn or borrowed. As recited in the TAMRA Conference Report, borrowing against the cash value of a policy does not result in gross income (except for a modified endowment contract which by its definition cannot include a policy the income taxation of which is governed by Section 7702(g)).

Section 817 and Section 7702(a)
As mentioned above, there are specific Code provisions that provide for the taxation of life insurance companies.33 Section 817 provides a special rule in determining that tax relating to variable contracts. Section 817(h) provides that, in order to be considered a variable contract for purposes of Subchapter L, which, as stated above, governs the taxation of insurance companies, as well as for purposes of Section 7702(a), so the contract is a life insurance policy, the investment component of the contract, among other things, must at least be adequately diversified as provided in Section 817(h) and the regulations promulgated thereunder.34 Hence, if the contract is not adequately diversified, then it seems that it is not treated as a life insurance policy for purposes of Section 7702(a) apparently even if it otherwise meets the definition of life insurance (because it is insurance under applicable (local) law and meets either the cash value accumulation or the guideline premium test). And the regulations indicate the tax treatment of a variable contract the investments in which are not adequately diversified is the same as a contract that does not meet at least one of the two tests under Section 7702(a) or, in other words, the annual increase in the net surrender value must be currently included in the gross income of the owner of the contract. Indeed, the regulations provide, in part:

“[F]or purposes of…section 7702(a), a variable contract…shall not be treated as…[a] life insurance contract…for which the investments of any such account are not adequately diversified.***If a variable contract which is a life insurance or endowment contract under other applicable (e.g., State or foreign) law is not treated as a life insurance… contract under section 7702(a), the income on the contract for any taxable year of the policyholder is treated as ordinary income received or accrued by the policyholder during such year in accordance with section 7702 (g) and (h).”35

Hence, just as current income taxation of the investment (cash value) component of a life insurance contract that fails to meet AT LEAST one of the two actuarial tests under Section 7702(a) occurs to the extent of the annual increase in the net surrender value so too is the income taxation of the investment component of a variable contract that fails to meet the diversification requirements of Section 817(h)—that is, only to the extent of the annual increase in the net surrender value (plus cost of insurance for the year).

No Income from Borrowing from Non-Section 7702(a) Policies

As discussed above, until 1988, borrowing from the cash value (investment) account of any life policy did not result in the owner having any gross income even if the cash value account exceeded premiums paid at the time of the borrowing. TAMRA made changes causing the owner of a MEC to include any borrowing from the cash value account in gross income to the extent the value (without regard to any surrender value) of the account exceeds premiums paid. And, as explained, an owner who borrows against the investment (cash) value of a contract that fails to meet AT LEAST one of the two actuarial tests of Section 7702(a) does not have to include any portion of the borrowing in gross income because any increase in net (cash) surrender value is annually taxed to the owner even if not borrowed or otherwise withdrawn. The same seems true for a policy that fails to meet the diversification requirements of Section 817(h) and, in that sense, is preferable to a Section 7702(a)  “compliant” contract that is a MEC.

Nonetheless, to avoid having to include increases in cash value in a contract that is not Section 7702(a) compliant and a contract that fails to meet the Section 817(h) diversification requirements, the net surrender value cannot exceed premiums paid. That means the owner of such contracts can borrow or make a partial surrender of the policy only up to the amount of premiums paid but no more—the owner (or the owner’s beneficiary) can receive more only upon the death of the insured. Hence, the owner is “locked” into the contract until it matures (by the death of the insured or the insureds). Therefore, a taxpayer should acquire such a frozen cash value only if the owner is certain that there will be no need to access from the policy more than the premiums paid.

Investor Control Doctrine
As mentioned earlier in this article, despite the fact the a taxpayer must report, as a general rule, only income actually or constructively received unless there is a statutory provision requiring inclusion without constructive receipt, the IRS has attempted to engraft an additional doctrine that could cause the owner of a variable life policy to include in gross income earnings “inside” the policy and without any statutory provision such as for MECs and for contracts that do not meet the definition of life insurance under Section 7702(a). And it seems to have tried to develop this “theory” despite the fact that the Commissioner has acquiesced, as noted above, in Cohen in which the Tax Court ruled there was no such constructive receipt with respect to earnings in the life insurance policy saying, as quoted above, “the petitioner’s right to receive the cash surrender value including periodic increments thereof was subject to such ‘substantial restrictions’ as to make inapplicable the doctrine of constructive receipt. Petitioner would have been required to surrender his entire investment in the policies in order to realize that income.” (Emphasis added.) The IRS calls this new theory of income taxation of life insurance policies (AND annuity contracts) the “investor control” doctrine.


“Even indirect communication with the insurance company or its advisor with respect to investments inside the policy by its owner alone could trigger the doctrine, causing the owner to be taxed on income earned inside the policy.”


The Service began its quest to establish that doctrine in Rev. Rul. 77-85.36 It has continued to issue several additional revenue and private letter rulings dealing with the doctrine.37 It was not until 2003, by the issuance of Rev. Rul. 2003-9138 and Rev. Rul. 2003-9339, that the Service, without explanation or proffered rationale, attempted to extend this alleged doctrine from variable annuity contracts to variable life insurance policies.40 In any event, the IRS has not established the parameters of the doctrine41, although it has indicated that having a variable contract offer investments through a so-called “insurance dedicated fund” or (“IDF”)42will not implicate the investor control issues provided, among other things, “no Private Placement Variable Annuity (PPVA) or Private Placement Variable Universal Life (PPVUL) Investment Account owner can directly or indirectly influence the IDF manager with respect to the selection of funds or securities to fulfill the IDF’s investment mandate.”43 Nonetheless, it may have suggested that even indirect communication with the insurance company or its advisor with respect to investments inside the policy by its owner alone could trigger the doctrine, causing the owner to be taxed on income earned inside the policy.44

The only authority upon which the IRS has relied in its revenue rulings is Christoffersen v. United States.45 However, reliance on Christoffersen, as approving the doctrine or establishing it, may be misplaced. First, that case involves an “annuity” contract, not life insurance. These are, of course, substantially different financial products46 and by and large are treated in quite different ways for tax purposes. As explained earlier, Sections 7702(a) and 7702A apply only to life policies, not annuities.47 As indicated above, the legislative history to those sections is filled with references exclusively to life insurance contracts, not both life insurance and annuity products.48

Second, as the United States Court of Appeals in Christoffersen points out, the taxpayers did not even claim the product had been “annuitized”—that is, had actually become an annuity contract.49 The court does go on to discuss that, under the arrangement in place during the tax years in question, the taxpayers “surrendered few of the rights of ownership or control over the assets of the sub-account” and that “the possibility that the assets [would] be converted into an annuity in 2021 [did] not significantly impair the Christoffersens’ ownership since all, or any portion, of the assets [could] be withdrawn before that time.”50 Perhaps, most important, in contrast to adopting any new doctrine of “investor control,” the court found, citing to Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a), quoted above and that sets forth the constructive receipt doctrine, that “[u]nder the long recognized doctrine of constructive receipt, the income generated by the account assets should be taxed to the plaintiffs in the year earned, not at some later time when the Christoffersens choose to receive it. This is the essence of Rev. Rul. 81-225, which we find persuasive.”51

The arrangement in Christoffersen seems entirely different than the life policy dealt with in Cohen: a policy of life insurance involves substantial shifting of risk at death that an annuity contract may not or at least does not in the same way a life policy does. And, as the Tax Court indicated in Cohen, this risk shifting would be forfeited by surrendering the policy and obtaining the underlying assets in the cash value account. This would seem to fall clearly under that part of Treas. Reg. 1.451-2(a), the constructive receipt of income regulation, which provides, in part, that “income is not constructively received if the taxpayer’s control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions.” And the restriction appears to be there regardless of the underlying investments in the policy or the identity of the person who controls the investments.

Perhaps, therefore, in light of the Service’s acquiescence in Cohen, the only viable hope for the IRS of some sort of judicial acceptance of an investor control doctrine with respect to variable life policies, other than constructive receipt, would be on the principles of income taxation enunciated in Helvering v. Clifford52, regarded by some as the seminal case of charging the grantor with a trust’s income prior to the adoption of the so-called Clifford regulations. Indeed, the IRS in Christoffersen rolled out such an argument, in addition to constructive receipt, to the Court of Appeals.53 The court, in comparing the Christoffersens’ interests in the “annuity” contract to those of the grantor in the trust in Clifford, stated, “Upon examination of the Contract as a whole, we must conclude that the Christoffersens, and not [the annuity company], own the assets of the sub-account.” But later in its opinion, the court stated, “Under the long recognized doctrine of constructive receipt, the income generated by the account assets should be taxed to the plaintiffs in the year earned, not at some later time when the Christoffersens choose to receive it. This is the essence of Rev. Rul. 81-225, which we find persuasive.” (footnote omitted; emphasis added.)

Consequently, it seems that it is uncertain how the court in Christoffersen reached its conclusion. It does not seem that Clifford is based upon the constructive receipt doctrine.54 The Supreme Court does not mention it in its opinion. It was observed long ago, in discussing Clifford and Douglas v. Willcuts,55 the latter case holding the grantor of a trust he created in connection with his divorce was to substitute for his alimony obligations and therefore the trust’s income was taxable to him:

The cases stemming from the [Douglas v.] Willcuts case emphasize the settlor’s support obligation, whereas one of the greatest avenues of expansion of the Clifford doctrine has developed on the settlor’s control. Nonetheless, these two approaches are so intertwined in the constructive receipt concept as to be almost inextricable. Often it is hard to tell just what the basis of the commissioner’s argument is….56 (emphasis added.)

So, although it is not certain, it may be that there are two doctrines that could possibly be applied: constructive receipt under Treas. Reg. 1.451-2(a) and deemed ownership of the assets under the Clifford principles. And, if either applies, the taxpayer will have to include the earnings in gross income. Cohen seemed to foreclose taxation under the constructive receipt doctrine with respect to a life insurance policy.57 If Clifford represents a doctrine separate from and in addition to constructive receipt, deciding whether the owner of a life policy is taxed on its earnings seems more complicated and, in many situations, uncertain.

As pointed out by many commentators, as well as the Treasury, Clifford turned on whether the taxpayer held a sufficient number of the “bundle of rights”58 of property ownership (and benefit) meaning its application had to be determined on a case by case basis. “Recognizing that the application of this principle ‘to varying and diversified factual situations’ has led to considerable uncertainty, the Treasury has now set down specific norms by which in its judgment the doctrine is to be applied,”59 by the promulgation of the Clifford regulations under Section 22 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (which were adopted with virtually no change as the “grantor trust” rules under Subpart E of Part 1 of Subchapter J of Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954).

In Clifford, the taxpayer held many rights60 and the court certainly did not indicate that investment control alone would be sufficient.61 “Our point here is that no one fact is normally decisive but that all considerations and circumstances of the kind we have mentioned are relevant to the question of ownership and are appropriate foundations for findings on that issue.”62

It is at least arguable that Congress was sufficiently concerned about the vagaries of the alleged investor control doctrine that it adopted Section 817(h) to provide a definite set of rules about it. “Because [Section] 817(h) and the associated regulations were enacted after the investor control authorities, and because they address some of the same issues as those authorities, many in the insurance industry concluded that [Section] 817(h) superseded the investor control doctrine.”63

At least part of the legislative history to the enactment of Section 817(h) supports that conclusion. “The [Deficit Reduction Act of 1984] adopts a provision that grants the Secretary of the Treasury regulatory authority to prescribe diversification standards***In authorizing the Treasury to prescribe diversification standards, the Congress intended that the standards be designed to deny annuity or life insurance treatment for investments that are publicly available to investors and investments which are made, in effect, at the direction of the investor. Thus, annuity or life insurance treatment will be denied to variable contracts (1) that are equivalent to investments in one or a relatively small number of particular assets (e.g., stocks, bonds, or certificates of deposit of a single issuer); (2) that invest in one or a relatively small number of publicly available mutual funds; (3) that invest in one or a relatively small number of specific properties (whether real or personal); or (4) that invest in a nondiversified pool of mortgage-type investments.***If the segregated account does not meet the prescribed diversification standards, then a variable contract based on the account will not be treated as an annuity, endowment, or life insurance contract for purposes of subchapter L (relating to taxation of insurance companies), section 72 and section 7702(a) (relating to the definition of a life insurance contract).”64

Although certain regulations, as noted above, have been promulgated by the Treasury under Section 817(h), none appears to deal with the four areas quoted above specifically or “investments which are made, in effect, at the direction of the investor.”65 This seems to have been acknowledged by the IRS. For example, in Rev. Rul. 2003-91, the Service stated:

Approximately two years after enactment of § 817(h), the Treasury Department issued proposed and temporary regulations prescribing the minimum level of diversification that must be met for an annuity or life insurance contract to be treated as a variable contract within the meaning of § 817(d). The preamble to the regulations stated as follows:

The temporary regulations . . . do not provide guidance concerning the circumstances in which investor control of the investments of a segregated asset account may cause the investor, rather than the insurance company, to be treated as the owner of the assets in the account. For example, the temporary regulations provide that in appropriate cases a segregated asset account may include multiple sub-accounts, but do not specify the extent to which policyholders may direct their investments to particular sub-accounts without being treated as owners of the underlying assets. Guidance on this and other issues will be provided in regulations or revenue rulings under section 817(d), relating to the definition of variable contracts.

T.D. 8101, 1986-2 C.B. 97 [51 FR 32633] (Sept. 15, 1986). The text of the temporary regulations served as the text of proposed regulations in the notice of proposed rulemaking. See LR-295-84, 1986-2 C.B. 801 [51 FR 32664] (Sept. 15, 1986). The final regulations adopted, with certain revisions not relevant here, the text of the proposed regulations.

As foreshadowed in T.D. 8101 (quoted immediately above), the IRS has issued revenue rulings66, but no regulations (proposed, temporary or final), dealing with investor control. However, unlike regulations, revenue rulings are not entitled to a high level of deference by the Federal courts.67 Essentially, revenue rulings seem to merely state the official position of the Service and are not binding upon taxpayers or courts as regulations may be.

In any event, it seems appropriate to mention that Section 817(h) and the definition of life insurance under Section 7702(a) were both enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. And the legislative history seems to make clear that the failure of a contract that is life insurance under applicable state law but fails to meet at least one of the two tests of Section 7702(a) or any diversification standard promulgated by regulation under Section 817(h) would mean the treatment of the contract would be as prescribed under Section 7702(g) which limits the current taxation of gain or income experienced inside the policy to annual increases in net surrender value only.68 This would seem to mean that the policy’s owner who has investor control would be taxed pursuant to Section 7702(g), which is the result of “flunking” the diversification requirements of Section 817(h), if the investor control doctrine is embodied somehow within the latter section.

But the IRS has indicated, at least in private letter rulings, that the investor control doctrine falls under the uncertain principles of Clifford, not Section 817(h).69 Although the Supreme Court in Clifford did mention that the taxpayer, to whom the trust income was attributed, held investment control over the assets, this “right” was only one of the several he held. Hence, it seems unlikely that the court would find under an application of Clifford to variable life insurance policies that controlling, much less merely communications about, investments would be sufficient to cause the income earned inside the policy to be attributed to the policy owner.70

In fact, it seems relatively certain that investor control over assets alone cannot under the Clifford principles cause the income from those assets to be taxed to the taxpayer holding that control even if the taxpayer paid the premiums on the life policy in which those assets are held. Less than two months after deciding Clifford, the Supreme Court decided Helvering v. Fuller.71 In that case, the taxpayer (Mr. Fuller of the famous Fuller Brush Company) created a trust, in connection with his divorce, for his wife. According to the dissent (by Justice Reed) “the settlement agreement shows that the husband retained voting power over the stock placed in trust. 60,380 shares of Class A Common Stock of the Fuller Brush Company, the only class of voting stock, was placed in the trust. An equal amount was retained by the taxpayer. The aggregate was a majority of the total of voting stock outstanding.”72 Yet it is certain that the Court, in holding the husband was not taxable on the dividends received by the trust, rejected both the application of the Clifford principles and the constructive receipt doctrine. In fact, although the Court was aware Mr. Fuller had the voting power, it stated, in part, “If the debtor retained no right or interest in and to the property, he would cease to be the owner for purposes of the federal revenue acts. See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331…”73 Hence, this voting power alone was not sufficient to cause the taxpayer to be taxed on the trust’s income. It seems, therefore, that control over investments alone is not sufficient to cause taxation either under the Clifford principles or constructive receipt. In fact, the IRS seems to have acknowledged that at least unofficially.74


“The consequence of the doctrine applying may be viewed as sufficiently adverse (no income tax avoidance) that most taxpayers likely will try to ensure that the structure of their life policies falls on the safe side of the doctrine.”


In any event, for the constructive receipt doctrine to be applied, the taxpayer must have had some entitlement to the income with which the taxpayer is charged. As mentioned above, if a contract of life insurance is a frozen cash value policy, no one can receive any income,75 and certainly not in the year it was earned. Such a policy is designed to maximize the death benefit, not to provide any access to the increase in cash value. Section 7702(g), which provides the income taxation of policies that fail to meet AT LEAST ONE OF the actuarial tests of Section 7702(a) or the diversification tests of Section 817(h), causes no current taxation of income except to the extent of an increase in net surrender value for the year (something that cannot occur under a frozen cash value policy).76 Hence, it would seem relatively certain that any investor control doctrine should not be applied, at least in the absence of further developments in the law (by legislation or, perhaps, regulation), to such a policy even if the doctrine has some viability in other contexts.77 It seems even more certain that the investor control doctrine should not apply if the owner is the insured under the frozen cash value policy as the insured could never access or benefit from the increase in the account value as it could never be accessed by anyone during the insured’s lifetime—in other words, it is difficult to discern what other “incidents of ownership,” in addition to controlling investments, the insured owner could have when no one during the insured’s lifetime could benefit from the “inside buildup” within the policy.78

Nonetheless, the consequence of the doctrine applying may be viewed as sufficiently adverse (no income tax avoidance) that most taxpayers likely will try to ensure that the structure of their life policies falls on the safe side of the doctrine, such as set forth, by example, in Rev. Rul. 2003-91.

Summary and Conclusions
Earnings inside a contract that constitutes life insurance under applicable (local) law that is not withdrawn is not subject to income taxation as earned except to the extent of the annual increase in net surrender value if the contract fails to meet AT LEAST one of the two tests set forth in Section 7702(a) or the diversification rules of Section 817(h) and its regulations. Moreover, neither the receipt of any amount by a partial surrender of the policy nor any amount received by a borrowing against cash value is included in gross income unless the policy is a MEC and then such an amount is included in income to the extent of the increase in cash value (determined without regard to any surrender charge). However, according to the Service’s investor control doctrine, a policy owner of a variable life policy will be taxed on the income earned inside the contract where the owner has an undefined level of control over the investments and, perhaps, has certain other undefined “incidents of ownership,” although, as mentioned, perhaps limited to annual increases in net surrender value if the doctrine falls under the purview of Section 817(h). Although, despite the contention of the IRS to the contrary, it does not seem that any court has adopted an independent investor control rule. Nonetheless, general tax principles developed by the Supreme Court, as reflected in the Clifford case might cause the owner of a variable contract to be taxed on the earnings in some cases. Hence, it seems prudent to attempt to ensure structuring the policy to avoid that result.

Citations

 

1 Frequently, individuals will claim they do not “believe” in life insurance, presumably meaning they do not think it is wise from a financial or investment perspective to acquire such a policy.
2 However, in some contexts, net amount at risk is the amount that would have to be paid if death occurred above the amount the insurer has in a reserve account for the payment. See, generally, http://rmtf.soa.org/net_amount.pdf.
3 See, generally, J. Blattmachr & M. Pasquale, “Buying Life Insurance to Fund Estate Taxes (A Counterintuitive Approach),” 151 Trusts & Estates 27 (July 2012).
4 Although called the “cash value” account, its value is not maintained as cash. Rather, the “cash” is invested in one of potentially several ways.
5 So-called “whole life” products usually are structured so a fixed premium is paid each year for life and provides a fixed death benefit regardless of when the insured dies. Some insurers vary those elements to try to differentiate their products from a standard whole life one—e.g., permit a single premium to be paid when the policy is acquired rather than having premium paid each year until the insured dies.
6 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Variable_universal_life_insurance. The amount of death benefit may vary, compared to a standard “whole life” policy, if it is a universal life policy whether or not it is a variable one, because the cash value will be dependent upon the amount credited to cash value by the insurance company if it is a universal one (but not variable) or upon the investment experience of the assets (e.g., mutual funds) held inside the policy if it is a variable universal one. One difference between variable policies, compared to non-variable but universal policies as well as compared to traditional whole life ones, is that, with a variable policy, the assets the policy owns in the cash value are held in a “segregated” account, meaning they are not subject to the claims of the insurance company’s creditors.
7 Cf., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868). See, also, Staff Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission (dated June 22, 2010), recommending that the SEC recommend to Congress a change in the definition of securities to include life settlements.
8 See, e.g., NY Insurance Law § 3212; NJSA § 17B:24-6; But cf. Cal Code Civ Proc § 704.100(b). There is even a limited exemption directly in the United States Bankruptcy Code. See G. Rothschild & D. Rubin, “Creditor Protection for Life Insurance and Annuities,” 4 Journal of Asset Protection 38 (May 1999) (“The federal bankruptcy exemptions for life insurance policies owned by the debtor are found at 11 U.S.C. sections 522(d)(7) and (8), where their relative importance to the average person is, perhaps, evidenced by their placement between the exemptions for the debtor’s professional books and tools of the trade and the debtor’s professionally prescribed health aids.”). Go to https://www.mosessinger.com/site/files/ CreditorProtectionLifeInsuranceAnnuities.pdf for a chart (not updated) for a summary of state law creditor protection exemptions.
9 Note that life insurance proceeds may be subject, in effect, to claims of the Federal government for estate taxes if the proceeds are included in the insured’s gross estate for Federal estate tax purposes even if not paid to the insured’s estate. See Sections 2042 and 2206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended (“Code”). Throughout this article, unless otherwise noted, the term “Section” means a section of the Code.
10 The proceeds payable at death may be includible in the insured’s gross estate for Federal estate tax purposes if the insured holds at (or by the application of Section 2035 within three years of) death any “incident of ownership” under the policy. However, “incident of ownership” is not fully defined in the tax law. (As will be discussed later in the text, the IRS has referred to “incidents of ownership” for purposes of its investor control doctrine, but it is not at all certain if it is intended to have the same meaning as it does under Section 2042). Although annuities are taxed, in some cases, in the same manner as life insurance products are, Section 2042 applies only to proceeds of insurance with respect to the estate of the insured and not to an annuity contract (the estate taxation of which is governed by Section 2039).
11 See, generally, Slade, “Personal Life Insurance Trusts,” BNA Tax Mgt. Portfolio No. 807-2d.
12 Although a taxpayer may have, under traditional notions of constructive receipt, income in a retirement plan described in Section 401 of the Code or an individual retirement account (IRA) under Section 408 or 408A, the Code does not require the taxpayer to report such constructively received income into gross income as earned. See, generally, N. Choate, Life and Death Planning for Retirement Benefits (7th Ed.,Ataxplan). Subpart E of Part 1 of Subchapter J of Chapter 1 of the Code contains the grantor trust rules under which the income of a trust may be attributed directly to the trust’s grantor (or another) without regard to the general constructive receipt of income doctrine. Section 1272 provides explicit rules for the taxation of original issue discount obligations (such a zero coupon bonds).
13 1964-1 CB 4.
14 See Section 101(a)(1).
15 There are exceptions such as under the so-called “transfer for value” rule under Section 101(a)(2), to which there are, in turn, exceptions, meaning the proceeds nonetheless may be excluded from gross income. See, generally, D. Zeydel, “The Transfer for Value Rule: Developments and Clarifications,” 134 Trusts & Estates 75 (April 1995).
16 It is apparent that “applicable law” is the applicable local law. Cf. Reg. 1.817-5(a)(1)(fourth sentence) (“If a variable contract which is a life insurance or endowment contract under other applicable (e.g., State or foreign) law is not treated as a life insurance or endowment contract under section 7702(a), the income on the contract for any taxable year of the policyholder is treated as ordinary income received or accrued by the policyholder during such year in accordance with section 7702 (g) and (h).”)
17 Section 7702 does not specify the consequences if the contract is not life insurance under applicable law. Presumably, it will simply be treated as an investment account, the earnings on which would be taxed to its owner as earned.
18 For a variety of reasons, typically including the recoupment of the costs incurred by the insurer in issuing a policy (e.g., sales commissions), the policy owner may be restricted in amount of cash value that may be withdrawn from the policy upon surrender (cancellation) or borrowing. The amount of cash value that may be withdrawn at any time is called the “net” (cash) surrender value as opposed to simply the surrender value (sometimes called the “account value”). Typically, the percentage of cash value that may not be withdrawn diminishes over time and may vanish after a few years. Section 7702(f) (2)(B) provides, “The net surrender value of any contract shall be determined with regard to surrender charges but without regard to any policy loan.”
19 The Section uses the phrasing, “the increase in the net surrender value of the contract during the taxable year.” According to one commentator, the gross income, at least with respect to a so-called “frozen cash value” policy, for the year is limited to the cost of insurance protection (as defined in Section 7702(g)(1)(D)) for the year plus “the lesser of: (1) the cash value, or (2) the sum of all premiums paid under the policy, computed without regard to any surrender charges and policy loans....” G. Nowotny, “Frozen Cash Value Life Insurance,” 151 Trusts & Estates 33, 34 (July 2012).
20 For example, assume that the owner has paid $20,000 in premiums in the first year but no additional premium, that the policy failed to meet AT LEAST one of the two tests of Section 7702(a), that gross cash (or account) value in the first year is $18,000 and that the net surrender value that year is only $15,000. Assume the gross cash value increases to $19,000 in the second year and the net surrender value increases to $16,500. Literally, under Section 7702(g), the owner would have to include in gross income the $1,500 increase in net surrender value occurring in the second year (plus the cost of insurance for the year). Although G. Nowotny may suggest there would be no such inclusion because the cash value would be below total premiums paid, there does not seem currently to be any announcement by the IRS or other authority that directly supports such a conclusion. Nonetheless, if net surrender value were defined under the policy to be the lesser of premiums paid or lowest surrender value for any year during the life of the policy, then there would seem to be no income imputed for any increase in net surrender value pursuant to Section 7702(g).
21 Section 7702(g)(2).
22 Section 7702(g)(3).
23 Policies that never have the net cash surrender value exceed premiums paid are called “frozen cash value policies.” See, generally, G. Nowotny.
24 Section 7702(g)(1)(B)(i)(II).
25 H.R. 4333.
26 H.R. 4333 at p. 96.
27 Id. at p. 97.
28 Id.
29 Section 72(e)(1).
30 In other words, with a policy whose taxation is governed by Section 7702(g), the owner is taxed on accessible increases in cash value even if there is no surrender or borrowing.
31 See Section 72(e)(10) which provides that Sections 72(e)(2)(B) and 72(e)(4)(A) apply to a modified endowment contract.
32 For example, assume, at the time of borrowing $30,000 from the cash value of a MEC, the premiums paid are $100,000, gross cash value is $125,000 but surrender charges are $15,000, making the net cash surrender value $110,000. The owner/borrower would have to include $25,000 in gross income (the amount by which the gross cash value of $125,000 exceeds premiums paid even though the owner can access only $10,000 of the $25,000 increase in gross cash value); the $5,000 balance of the borrower would not be included in gross income but would be treated as a return of investment.
33 See Section 801 et. seq.
34 Reg. 1.817-5(b).
35 Reg. 1.817-5(a). Section 7702(h) deals with certain endowment contracts.
36 1977-1 CB 12.
37 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 80-274, 1980-2 CB 27; Rev. Rul. 81-225, 1985-2 CB 12; Rev. Rul. 82-54, 1982-1 CB 11; PLR 201417007 (not precedent); PLR 201323002 (not precedent).
38 2003-2 CB 347.
39 2003-2 CB 350.
40 The Service seems consistently to look at the owner (often referred to as the “Holder”) of the policy suggesting, perhaps, that if someone, other than the policy owner, holds sufficient control over investments that the doctrine which would apply if the control were held by owner, does not apply to such other person. In other words, if someone other than the owner holds investment control (e.g., the spouse of the owner or a trust that does not cause the owner to be treated as its income tax owner under Section 671), the doctrine, at least as the IRS has apparently attempted to apply it, would not apply. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2003-91, 2003- 2 CB 347. “There is no arrangement, plan, contract, or agreement between Holder and [Insurance Company] or between Holder and [Investment] Advisor regarding the availability of a particular Sub-account, the investment strategy of any Sub-account, or the assets to be held by a particular sub-account.” (Emphasis added.) See also Chief Counsel Advice 200840043 (not precedent). There is apparently no constructive ownership rule under the doctrine, even assuming the doctrine exists. Cf. Minahan v. Commissioner, 88 TC 472 (1987), in which the Tax Court imposed sanctions against the IRS for continuing to attempt to apply a constructive ownership or aggregation rule for certain wealth transfer valuation purposes where no statutory constructive ownership rule existed and stated, in part, “It has been noted that the Congress has explicitly directed that family attribution or unity of ownership principles be applied in certain aspects of Federal taxation, and in the absence of legislative directives, judicial forums should not extend such principles beyond those areas specifically designated by Congress. Furthermore, the subjective inquiry into feelings, attitudes, and anticipated behavior might well be boundless.” (Citation omitted.)
41 For example, under the doctrine, if the investments in the annuity contract are available to the general public, the owner will be taxed on the income. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 82-54. And, it is at least arguable, that the IRS in attempting to perpetuate the doctrine, has ignored treasury regulations promulgated under Section 817(h). See, e.g., PLR 200244001[10002] (not precedent)
42 An insurance dedicated fund has been defined as being “similar in many ways to [a] private investment fund. It may be established directly by either an insurer, a mutual or hedge fund or by a qualified high-net worth investor. Its defining characteristic is that it is only available for use in a tax-compliant, private placement…Annuity or Private Placement Life Insurance policy.” http://www.swiss-annuity.com/php/what_we_do/international_investment_ strategies/what_we_do_international_insurance.php.
43 M. Liebeskind, “IRS Clarifies the Structuring of Insurance-Dedicated Funds,” (June 16, 2014), discussing PLR 201417007 (not precedent) at http:// wealthmanagement.com/insurance/irs-clarifies-structuring-insurance-dedicated-funds.
44 “Moreover, Holder cannot communicate directly or indirectly with any investment officer of [Insurance Company] or its affiliates or with Advisor regarding the selection, quality, or rate of return of any specific investment or group of investments held in a Sub-account.” Rev. Rul. 2003-91, 20032 CB 347. Although it seems extraordinary that merely having communications with the insurer or its advisor about investment but without any legally enforceable right to control investments in any way could result in income earned on the investment being attributed to the owner/communicator, the IRS from time to time has indicated that adverse tax results will occur even if the taxpayer merely holds an expectation of investment activity. See, e.g., PLR 7737071 (not precedent), although arising in another context of whether gain recognized on appreciated assets contributed to a charitable remainder trust, described in Section 664, should be included in the gross income of the trust’s grantor. But it does not seem the IRS has taken such an extreme position in court. Cf. Palmer v. Commissioner, 62 TC 684, aff’d on another issue, 523 F. 2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1975), to which the IRS acquiesced in 1978-1 CB 2, where the court held that gain recognized by the liquidation of a corporation with respect to shares given to charity before the liquidation plan was adopted would not be attributed back to the donor, saying, in part, “Although we recognize that the vote [to liquidate] was anticipated,…that expectation was not enough.” 62 TC at 693. But cf. Ferguson v. Commissioner, 174 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999).
45 749 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1984), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied (1985).
46 Unlike an annuity product, a life insurance policy involves a significant risk shifting from the “owner” and the beneficiaries who will succeed to the death benefit, on the one side, to the insurance company, on the other. See Helvering v Le Gierse, 312 US 531 (1941).
47 Although Section 72 deals with certain income taxation aspects of both annuity and life insurance contracts, the taxation is not the same. See, e.g., Section 72(e)(5)(C), which states, “Except as provided in paragraph (10) [relating to MECs] and except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary by regulations, this paragraph shall apply to any amount not received as an annuity which is received under a life insurance or endowment contract.”)
48 See, e.g., H.R. 4333 at pp. 96-97.
49 The Court of Appeals framed the issue on appeal as “whether the…Contract, purchased by the taxpayers…, is an annuity…and qualified to deferred tax treatment…” and stated, in part, “The Christoffersens do not argue that the monies received by the Trust are funds received under an annuity. The annuity does not start until the year 2021 and then only if taxpayer elects to exercise his contract at that time” and concluded that “[b]ecause the dividends were not received under an annuity, [the deferral of taxation allowed for annuity contracts under] Section 72(e) is not applicable [and] [t]he dividends must be included in gross income….” 749 F.2d at 516.
50 Id. at 515, 516.
51 Id. at 516.
52 309 US 331 (1940).
53 See Brief of Appellant, Christoffersen v. United States, 84-1420-NI (8th Cir.) (filed June 6, 1984), at I, 4-5, 7-17 for the government’s other theories raised with the court.
54 The doctrine of constructive receipt goes back to at least 1918. See Article 53 of Regulations 45 under the Revenue Act of 1918. So the Court must have been aware of it. However, the decision of the Court of Appeals in Christoffersen may read as concluding that Clifford is based upon the doctrine of constructive receipt.
55 296 US 1 (1935).
56 Note, “The Federal Estate Tax and Discretionary Powers to Invade Trust Corpus or Accumulate Income,” 97 U. of Penn Law R. 221 (1948), n. 82. See, also, A. Guterman, “The Federal Income Tax and Trusts for Support—The Stuart Case and Its Aftermath,” 57 Harv. L. Rev. 479, 487 (1944), where, in discussing income taxation of trust income to the settlor on account of an obligation of support, the author states, in part, “It is not impossible that some general doctrine compounded of the Douglas and Clifford cases may be adduced to hurdle this difficulty. But it would certainly require a straining of the present doctrine of constructive receipt based on Section 22(a) [(the section of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 that defines gross income)] to impose a tax on a grantor by reason of the possibility of use of unrestricted income by the dependent to discharge the grantor’s legal obligations without the benefit of the specific terms of a statutory provision such as Section 167 [of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and which section is the predecessor to Section 677 of the Internal Revenue Codes of 1954 and 1986].”
57 As long as the contract is a life insurance policy under local law, it is treated as such for all tax purposes (“If any contract which is a life insurance contract under the applicable law does not meet the definition of life insurance contract under subsection (a), such contract shall, notwithstanding such failure, be treated as an insurance contract for purposes of this title”—Section 7702(g)(3)), except for the income tax treatment specified in the Code such as (1) under Section 7702(g)(1)(A) (“If at any time any contract which is a life insurance contract under the applicable law does not meet the definition of life insurance contract under subsection (a), the income on the contract for any taxable year of the policyholder shall be treated as ordinary income received or accrued by the policyholder during such year”), (2) under Section 72(e) for MECs, and (3) under Section 7702(g)(1)(A) for policies that do not meet the diversification requirements of Section 817(h). The Code does not provide it will not be treated as a life policy in any circumstance where it is one under applicable (local) law. The specific treatment and definition of life insurance (which appears to be determined exclusively by applicable law) under the Code seems to foreclose a finding that the owner of the policy “owns” assets within the contract. Although the Court of Appeals in Christoffersen may have found them to be owned by the contract owners, the contract was not a policy of life insurance which, as stated, is determined (except for the prescribed special income tax treatment) by applicable (local) law. The Court of Appeals found the contract not even to be an annuity contract. It does not seem it could have found a contract not to be a policy of life insurance if it was one under local law. Nonetheless, the IRS might argue that, although the contract is a policy of insurance and entitled to the tax treatment specified in the Code, its assets are “owned” for income tax purposes by the policy owner, although that would seem inconsistent with the specific treatment under the Code for such contracts.
58 “A ‘bundle of sticks’-- in which each stick represents an individual right - is a common analogy made for the bundle of rights.”http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Bundle_of_rights. See Frank Lyons Company v. US, 536 F.2d 746, mod’d on denial of reh. and reh. denied (1976), rev’d, 435 US 565 (1978) (“We examine the issue of ownership by examining the respective rights held by the parties. In the common law sense, property rights can be analogized to a bundle of sticks. Each stick represents an interest in the underlying res which is the object of property”)
59 J. Lynch, “The Treasury Interprets the Clifford Case,” 15 Fordham L. Rev. 161, 161 (Nov. 1946). See, also, M. Ascher, “The Grantor Trust Rules Should Be Repealed,” 96 Iowa L. Rev. 885 (2011) (“fine-grained legal analysis…[Clifford] most certainly was not. *** Predictably, the floodgates of litigation opened wide.” (footnote omitted.)) To avoid further disputes on whether a grantor (or another) could be taxed on the income earned by a trust, Section 671 states, in part, “No items of a trust shall be included in computing the taxable income and credits of the grantor or of any other person solely on the grounds of his dominion and control over the trust under section 61 (relating to definition of gross income) or any other provision of this title, except as specified in this subpart.”
60 “The settlor had created an irrevocable trust for a five-year term for the benefit of his wife and had retained for himself a reversionary interest in the entire trust corpus. As trustee, he had also retained a number of other controls over the trust property, the most significant of which seems to have been the power to determine how much, if any, of the trust income his wife would actually receive in any given year.***As trustee, the settlor had ‘full power’ to vote the stock held in trust; to ‘sell, exchange, mortgage, or pledge’ any of the trust assets on ‘such terms and for such consideration’ as he in his ‘absolute discretion [deemed] fitting’; to invest the trust assets ‘without restriction’; to collect the trust income; to compromise any claims held in trust; and to hold the trust property in his own or, an assessment of the settlor’s powers, a provision that supplemented the applicable principal and income rules, an exculpatory clause, and a provision that conferred spendthrift protections on the wife’s income interest. [Helvering v. Clifford, 309 US] at 333.” M. Ascher, supra, at 890. (footnotes omitted.)
61 Although arising in the context of potential inclusion of trust property in a settlor’s gross estate, the Supreme Court in United States v. Byrum, 408 US 125 (1972), seems to conclude that mere management and control over investment in a trust are insufficient to cause the property to be included in the settlor’s gross estate and appears to cite with approval, Estate of King v. Commissioner, 37 T C 973 (1962), which, according to the Supreme Court, held that where, “a settlor reserved the power to direct the trustee in the management and investment of trust assets,” there is no estate tax inclusion. 408 US at 133.
62 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 US at 336.
63 Giordani & Chesner, “Private Placement Life Insurance and Annuities,” 870 T.M., at A-20.
64 General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (H.R., 4170, 98th Congress; Public Law 98-369), prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (December 31, 1984) (“General Explanation”), pp. 607-609.
65 This reinforces the notion that, as mentioned in note 5, if someone other than the owner chooses the investments (e.g., the spouse of the policy owner) then a regulatory investor control rule should not apply.
66 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2003-91; Rev. Rul. 2003-92.
67 “‘Deference to Revenue Rulings’ ‘A “Revenue Ruling” is an official interpretation by the Service that has been published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. Revenue Rulings are issued only by the National Office and are published for the information and guidance of taxpayers, Internal Revenue Service officials, and others concerned.” Statement of Procedural Rules. ‘We are not bound by revenue rulings, and, applying the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Skidmore v. *209 Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944), the weight (if any) that we afford them depends upon their persuasiveness and the consistency of the Commissioner’s position over time. See PSB Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 131, 142, 2007 WL 3225191 (2007)(“[W]e evaluate the revenue ruling under the less deferential standard enunciated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)”).16 The Statement of Procedural Rules acknowledges the meaningful distinction to be drawn between regulations and revenue rulings. See sec. 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d ), statement of procedural rules (“revenue rulings published in the Bulletin do not have the force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations (including Treasury *210 decisions), but are published to provide precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases, and may be cited and relied upon for that purpose.”).’” Taproot Admin. Servs. v Commissioner, 133 TC 202 (2014), aff’d, 679 F 3d. 1109 (9th Cir. 2012).
68 Any regulation that deals with these matters should be prospective only. “The Congress anticipated that any regulations prescribing diversification standards changing current practice will have a prospective effective date.” General Explanation, p. 607.
69 Citing to Clifford, the IRS has stated, “In its revenue rulings, the Service takes the position that, if the holders of a variable life insurance policy or variable annuity contract possess sufficient incidents of ownership over the assets supporting the policy or contract, they are considered the owners of the underlying assets for federal income tax purposes. Although the rulings apply only to variable insurance products, they cite and adopt the language of the general tax ownership cases and conclude that contract holders who possess control over the investment of the separate account assets (in addition to the other benefits and burdens of contract ownership) are the owners of separate account assets for federal income tax purposes even if the insurance company retains possession of, and legal title to, those assets.” (footnotes omitted; emphasis added.) PLR 201417007 (not precedent).
70 Although private letter rulings (“PLRs”) may not, under Section 6110(k)(3), be cited or used as precedent, the IRS has indicated that there must be sufficient “incidents of ownership” to cause the owner to be taxed on income earned inside a variable insurance or annuity contract. (“the Service takes the position that, if the holders of a variable life insurance policy or variable annuity contract possess sufficient incidents of ownership over the assets supporting the policy or contract, they are considered the owners of the underlying assets for federal income tax purposes.”) PLR 201417007 (not precedent). But the Service has not, as mentioned in the text, ever spelled out the parameters of such a test.
71 310 US 69 (1940).
72 Id. at 79.
73 Id. at 74.
74 As noted above, in PLR 201417007 (not precedent), the Service in describing its investor control revenue rulings states that the revenue rulings “conclude that contract holders who possess control over the investment of the separate account assets (in addition to the other benefits and burdens of contract ownership) are the owners of separate account assets for federal income tax purposes even if the insurance company retains possession of, and legal title to, those assets.” (footnote omitted; emphasis added.)
75 Although one may contend that the owner (or the owner’s beneficiaries) would receive the income upon the death of the insured, Section 101(a)(1) explicitly provides, subject to exceptions, that the death benefit (including increases in cash value) is not included in gross income.
76 It may be noted that, in Clifford, the taxpayer could not receive the income for five years because it was payable for that period to his wife. The Supreme Court noted that the close family relationship meant that the taxpayer, as a practical matter, would benefit from the income currently as paid to his wife. However, with a frozen cash value policy, no one can receive any benefit from the income until the insured dies, other than its use to pay the cost of the net amount at risk which, as mentioned above, is currently taxed to the policy’s owner.
77 As noted above, in PLR 201417007 (not precedent), the Service seems to acknowledge that control over investments alone is not sufficient for the income inside the contract to be taxed to the owner because the IRS revenue rulings “conclude that contract holders who possess control over the investment of the separate account assets (in addition to the other benefits and burdens of contract ownership) are the owners of separate account assets for federal income tax purposes even if the insurance company retains possession of, and legal title to, those assets.” (footnote omitted; emphasis added.)
78 In a similar vein, it seems that if the policy is owned by a non-grantor trust, the investor control doctrine, applied under the Clifford principles, should not apply merely because the grantor controls investments. Virtually, by definition, neither the grantor nor the grantor’s spouse would have any beneficial interest and investment control does not trigger grantor trust status except in the limited circumstance as to stock as described in Section 675. Although the IRS might contend the grantor should be treated as owning the policy (and under some other doctrine the policy’s underlying assets) if the trust were a grantor trust (see Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 CB 184), there is no such imputed ownership if it is not a grantor trust.

SPATs: A Flexible Asset Protection Alternative to DAPTs

by Abigail E. O’Connor, JD, Mitchell M. Gans, JD, and Jonathan G. Blattmachr, JD, LLM

Originally published in Estate Planning magazine, February 2019

Many estate planning attorneys and their clients currently are wrestling with ways to best use the temporary increase in the federal applicable estate tax exclusion. For super high net-worth clients, a gift of $5.5 million (or $11 million for a married couple) may be nothing more than a blip off of the portfolio, and the move takes very little thought. For clients in the high net worth range ($5 million to $20 million), but not super high net worth (over $20 million), the decision typically is more difficult. Estate tax savings has to be weighed against the potential need for the assets later during lifetime. What are the options for these clients?

A similar question arises in the context of asset-protection planning: how to achieve creditor protection without fully relinquishing access to the assets. In both contexts – asset-protection and estate tax planning – self-settled trusts often are used. A self-settled trust, also called a “domestic asset protection trust” (DAPT) when created in America, is an irrevocable trust created by an individual in which that individual is designated as a beneficiary. Given the possibility that the creditor protection aspects of DAPTs may be disregarded under the laws of many states,1 however, the question becomes whether there is another option.


“While self-settled trusts may be excellent options for estate planning and creditor protection, the number of jurisdictions in which they can be used are limited.”


This article proposes the use of an irrevocable trust created for beneficiaries other than the grantor, in which one or more individuals (who are not the grantor and are not necessarily a beneficiary) have a lifetime special power of appointment, held in a nonfiduciary capacity, that may be used to direct assets back to or for the benefit of the grantor. The grantor would have no entitlement to benefits or even eligibility to receive benefits in the discretion of the trustee or another fiduciary; but only by the exercise of a special power of appointment held by someone in a nonfiduciary capacity-essentially a non-self-settled trust from which the grantor may benefit. In other words, the grantor would have no more right to benefit from the assets than if they were owned by someone else individually. To be sure, the concept of allowing the grantor to benefit from the trust assets through the exercise of a special power of appointment is not new. But questions about the structure of such an arrangement and its effectiveness need to be considered.

The discussion that follows begins with a brief explanation of how assets in a trust created by one person for the benefit of a beneficiary (other than the grantor) can be protected from creditors of the beneficiary. It also considers the creditor-protection issue in the context of a self-settled trust. Next it explores the use of the special power of appointment trust (SPAT). Following that, conclusions are set forth.

Spendthrift Trusts
One of the primary purposes of creating trusts is to protect property held for the beneficiaries – often spouses or descendants – from their potential creditors. This protection both assures financial stability for the beneficiaries and preserves assets that may be the legacy of a family, such as family business. Spendthrift trusts can be created for finite periods, or in some states, can continue indefinitely, or at least until the assets are depleted.

An irrevocable trust is called a “spendthrift trust” if it contains a provision (or state law essentially provides one) that says the interest of a beneficiary cannot be alienated or involuntarily transferred. In such a case, the creditor of the beneficiary typically cannot reach the assets except to the extent the assets are distributed to and are in the hands of the beneficiary. There are some exceptions to spendthrift protection in some states, such as where a beneficiary cannot or refuses to pay court-ordered child support.2 But if the beneficiary finds himself or herself in some type of financial trouble, such as a loss of employment or business failure, the assets in trust are safe from that beneficiary’s creditors.3 Generally, these spendthrift trusts work well and are respected by the courts, again with few, if any, exceptions.4

One important qualification is that spendthrift protection is generally available only in the case of a third-party trust. A grandparent creates a trust for children and grandchildren. A husband creates a trust for a wife. A child creates a trust for a parent. All of these are universally acceptable as providing protection of the trust assets against claims against the trust beneficiaries. When a person creates an irrevocable trust and names himself or herself as a beneficiary, however, even if there are other beneficiaries, the trust becomes a self-settled trust.

Background on Sell-Settled Trusts
As mentioned above, a self-settled trust is one created for the benefit of the grantor. In some cases, it will be an irrevocable trust created by a person (the grantor), for that same person (as at least one beneficiary), with the hope and, perhaps, expectation that the assets of which generally will be protected from the grantor’s creditors. A person-the grantor-creates the trust with another individual or corporation as the trustee. The grantor also is a beneficiary, generally with other family members. For example, a parent creates an irrevocable trust in which the parent, his or her spouse, and his or her children all are beneficiaries.

Under the common law, spendthrift protection was not available with respect to the creditors of the grantor-beneficiary in the case of a self-settled trust. In 1997, Alaska enacted ground-breaking legislation that extended spendthrift protection to self-settled trusts.5 Today, approximately 18 states have enacted similar legislation. These states often are referred to as “DAPT states” or “DAPT jurisdictions.”

Although the requirements in each of the DAPT states differ slightly, there are some general rules of thumb:

• The grantor’s interest must be discretionary, meaning that he or she can have no right to income or principal.

• The trustee decides whether and, if so, when to distribute income and principal back to the grantor.

• The trust instrument should have the same spendthrift language discussed above.

• Almost universally, in order to be effective, the transfer to the trust cannot be a fraudulent conveyance, and the grantor cannot be insolvent when creating the trust; in addition, the transfer cannot render the grantor insolvent.6

• The grantor must not have a prearranged agreement with the trustee that he or she will receive distributions (no “wink-and-nod” agreement).7

The most obvious benefit of a self-settled trust is that the trust assets may be protected from the grantor’s creditors in the event the grantor runs into creditor issues. When structured properly, they work quite well.8

There are, however, some qualifications. As noted above, Bankruptcy Code section 548(e) imposes a ten-year lookback period if the trust was created to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor. This makes it necessary to create the trust well in advance of any financial distress. In addition, as a matter of state law and bankruptcy law, fraudulent transfers to self-settled trusts generally will not be protected.9 Further, states cannot assert exclusive jurisdiction over fraudulent transfer actions,10 so creating a trust in one jurisdiction and funding it from assets located in another jurisdiction may expose the grantor to actions in the latter jurisdiction. Self-settled trusts can be “sticky” areas in divorce, as often both the grantor and the grantor’s spouse are beneficiaries.11

Where a self-settled trust is entitled to spendthrift protection, it offers estate-planning advantages: The trust’s assets can possibly be excluded from the grantor’s gross estate even though the grantor has retained some access to the trust’s assets. This makes a self-settled trust an attractive estate planning tool. Where, however, distributions to the grantor or other factors suggest that there was an implied understanding at the outset that the grantor would enjoy access to the trust’s assets, the trust will not achieve its estate planning objective. In the case of such an understanding, the trust assets are included in the grantor’s gross estate at the value on date of death.12

A gift to a self-settled trust effectively is an irrevocable gift with a built-in escape hatch. Although the grantor should not receive assets from the trust on a regular basis, the possibility of a future distribution eases the concern of “I don’t want to give it away because I may need it.” In essence, the property owner may give away the assets and thereby fix their value for estate tax purposes, but may later obtain access to them (of course, trustee discretion permitting).

While self-settled trusts may be excellent options for estate planning and creditor protection, the number of jurisdictions inwhich they can be used are limited. A person who wants to avail himself or herself of the benefits of a self-settled trust needs to create the trust in a DAPT state. Otherwise, in non-DAPT states where the common law prevails, spendthrift protection cannot be applied to a grantor’s interest in his or her own irrevocable trust; the grantor’s creditors can reach the maximum amount that can be distributed by the trustee to or for the grantor’s benefit.13 Some non-DAPT states simply rely on the common law; other non-DAPT states, such as New York, go further and have language expressly supporting the common law.14

Some clients have reservations about using self-settled trusts. Geography is one factor. Because most states are non-DAPT states and do not support the notion of self-settled trusts, creating one usually means that the grantor has to locate the trust in another state – a DAPT state. Each state has its own rules for determining what is a sufficient nexus to have a trust in that jurisdiction, such as designating a trustee with a place of business or residence in that state. Another factor is that some clients are concerned that, despite the existence of the self-settled trust in the DAPT state, their home states still may find a way to reach the assets.15 Lastly, these trusts may seem to some just a little too “edgy.” Although these trusts have been used as effective estate planning tools for years, they still are beyond the comfort zone for some. For all of these clients, there may be an alternative, which is the primary subject of this article.

What is a SPAT?

A SPAT is an alternative approach for clients who have reservations about using DAPTs. Under a SPAT, the grantor creates an irrevocable spendthrift trust for others and does not designate himself or herself as a beneficiary. The grantor gives one or more individuals who are not necessarily a beneficiary of the trust a special lifetime power of appointment. The power is held in a nonfiduciary capacity, and it permits the holder of the power to appoint trust assets to a class of individuals that includes the grantor (such as the descendants of grantor’s mother). This special power provides an escape hatch: The powerholder can appoint the assets back to or for the benefit of the grantor.

The SPAT is not a self-settled trust. Because the grantor is not a beneficiary, the self-settled trust rule in common law jurisdictions under which the grantor’s creditors can reach the trust’s assets-is not applicable. Accordingly, there should be no need to use a DAPT state. Nonetheless, to the extent that there is concern that creditors could argue that a SPAT should be treated as if it were a self-settled trust (see below for discussion of this point), it would make sense to locate the trust in a DAPT state.

Where a grantor resides in a common law state and creates a trust in a DAPT state, there is a risk that courts in the grantor’s home state might conclude that spendthrift protection in the case of a self-settled trust offends its strong public policy, and as a result, refuse to respect the DAPT state’s legislation.16 The likelihood that a court in a common law state would find the DAPT legislation in violation of its strong public policy could well be diminished if the grantor uses a SPAT instead of a DAPT.

Options for Structuring the Trust
The trust should be irrevocable and designed for the grantor’s tax and nontax goals, as with any trust. The usual considerations regarding selecting beneficiaries, trustees, and dispositive provisions play pretty much the same as for any irrevocable trust. With that said, there are some specific provisions to include or exclude depending on several attributes of the trust.

Should the trust be a grantor trust or a non-grantor trust? If the primary goal is estate tax minimization, then creating a grantor trust provides the opportunity for additional tax-free gifting. If grantor trust status is not optimal, such as if the grantor’s cash flow would make the payment of tax burdensome, or if the grantor lives in a high-tax state and plans to settle the trust in a jurisdiction with no or a low state income tax, then grantor trust status should be avoided.


“ If the primary goal is estate tax minimization, then creating a grantor trust provides the opportunity for additional tax-free gifting.”


If grantor trust status is not desired, then special care in the drafting is necessary to avoid inadvertently triggering the grantor trust rules.17 A power of appointment that can revest trust assets in the grantor that is exercisable by a non-adverse party, without the approval or consent of an adverse party, results in the grantor being treated as the owner of those trust assets for income tax purposes.18 In addition, the grantor is treated as the owner (for income tax purposes) of any part of the income of the trust that can be distributed back to the grantor without the approval or consent of an adverse party or accumulated for future distribution to the grantor.19 Consequently, if grantor trust status is not desired, the powerholder needs to be an adverse party, or the consent of an adverse party needs to be necessary before distributions are made to or for the grantor.20

Alternatively, if there are multiple powerholders, then at least one of them, whose consent is required to exercise the power, must be an adverse party. If the grantor retained a reversionary interest in the trust, then the trust would be a grantor trust;21 however, a special powerholder’s ability to appoint assets to the transferor, with the consent of an adverse party, does not appear to be a reversionary interest.22

If grantor trust status is desired, then the grantor has numerous options. He or she can appoint a non-adverse party as the special powerholder, as discussed above, who can exercise the power without the consent of an adverse party. The grantor also can retain the ability to substitute assets of equivalent value property,23 or include a variety of provisions that are addressed in the grantor trust rules.24 Creating grantor trust status is easy. Avoiding it takes much more thought, as explained above.

Should the gift to the trust be complete or incomplete? For the grantor who wants to fix the value of their assets for transfer tax purposes, that grantor will need to make sure that the assets conveyed to the trust will not be included in his or her gross estate-which requires a completed gift. If the purpose of the trust, on the other hand, is solely to achieve creditor protection, then the grantor may not want to complete the gift. A gift is complete when the grantor has parted with dominion and control and, therefore, has no ability to change its disposition.25

Traditional irrevocable trusts created for a grantor’s descendants or spouse, with no ability to receive the assets back, either via a trustee’s discretionary distribution (such as for a DAPT) or through the exercise of a special power of appointment (such as for a SPAT), generally are completed gifts.

If the grantor wishes the transfer to be an incomplete gift, then he or she should retain a special lifetime power of appointment and/or a power to veto distributions proposed by the trustee and a testamentary power of appointment. The gift is incomplete, because the grantor retains the power to change the ultimate disposition of the assets.26 If the grantor changes his or her mind after the trust is created, he or she can relinquish the power and complete the gift.27

Structuring the Power of Appointment – By Whom and To Whom?
There are various ways to structure the power of appointment. The two most significant aspects of the power are the identity of the powerholder and the class of permissible appointees. Each aspect is discussed in turn.

There are two choices for the identity of the powerholder: a beneficiary or a nonbeneficiary. As explained above, if the grantor wants to avoid grantor trust status, at least one powerholder needs to be an adverse party (or must be able to exercise the power only with the consent of one), which means someone with a “significant beneficial interest” whose interest would be adversely affected by the exercise of the power. If the grantor does not care about triggering grantor trust status, or intentionally desires grantor trust status, then the powerholder need not be adverse and need not require the consent of an adverse party to exercise the power. There are some concerns about appointing a beneficiary as a powerholder (other than the grantor trust issue). An exercise of the power by the beneficiary-powerholder could be treated as a taxable gift by the powerholder, which may be viewed as an adverse consequence. In Estate of Regester,28 the U.S. Tax Court held that a beneficiary with a mandatory income interest and discretionary principal interest in a trust, who also had a special lifetime power of appointment, made a gift of her income interest when she exercised her power in favor of a trust for her grandchildren. The court focused on the powerholder’s mandatory income interest, not her discretionary interest in the principal. One interpretation is that the powerholder makes a gift only if the powerholder has a mandatory right to the income or principal of the trust; a more conservative interpretation is that there definitely is a gift with a mandatory interest, but a gift still may be the result even with a discretionary interest.


“It may be wise to provide that the powerholder needs the consent of some nonadverse party such as a partner in the law firm that has represented the grantor.”


The class of permissible appointees must consist of individuals or entities in addition to the grantor. There would be nothing to stop the powerholder from exercising the power to direct the assets away from the grantor. On the other hand, the powerholder could be given the power only to appoint the property to or for the grantor, although this might be used as evidence that there was an understanding with the grantor and powerholder that the latter had agreed to benefit the former.

The appointment of multiple powerholders may solve the concerns raised above. If grantor trust status is not desired, then one should be an adverse party (a beneficiary with a “substantial beneficial interest”), and any exercise should be made either unanimously or by majority but with the adverse party’s consent. If grantor trust is desired, then the powerholders do not have to be adverse parties (as noted above, there are other ways to make a trust a grantor trust). Having the power exercised by one or more persons who are not beneficiaries, however, without the need for the beneficiary’s agreement, means that the power can be exercised without triggering a gift by the beneficiary. The “team” approach also gives the grantor a little more comfort that one rogue powerholder could not exercise the power in a manner that harms the grantor.

The class of permissible appointees can be defined in various ways. The ability to appoint to “any person or entity” generally would include the grantor. To narrow the choices and at least assure that assets remain in the family, the class can consist of the descendants of the grantor’s parents or grandparents. If, in reality, the grantor is the only descendant, then the power might be viewed more as a distribution provision than a power. There likely are numerous more ways to create the class, but the drafter must be careful to include the grantor and probably others. As the power is a special power, the drafter also must be sure to exclude the powerholder, his or her creditors or estate, and creditors of his or her estate, from the list of permissible appointees, as being able to distribute to any of those means the powerholder will have a general power of appointment for estate and gift tax and, perhaps, state creditor rights purposes.29

Advantages of a SPAT
The trust, as drafted, is not a self-settled trust. The grantor is not a beneficiary, only one of, perhaps, numerous potential appointees under a power of appointment held in a nonfiduciary capacity. A beneficiary is a person for whose benefit property is held in trust.30 To be a beneficiary, the grantor must manifest an intention to give the person a beneficial interest; merely benefiting incidentally from the performance of the trust does not render a person a beneficiary.31 The trust, therefore, is afforded the same treatment as any ordinary irrevocable trust, of which the grantor is not a beneficiary.

The trust provides asset protection both for the grantor and the beneficiaries. As long as the trust contains the spendthrift language, then the beneficiaries’ creditors cannot reach the assets as long as they remain in the trust. Neither can the grantor’s creditors reach the assets. The trust retains all of the protections of any ordinary spendthrift trust.

The transaction can be structured as a completed gift, so the grantor uses his or her applicable lifetime exclusion, or to the extent already used, pays gift tax on the value of the assets transferred. Again, from this standpoint, the trust and the transfer to the trust is no different than any other ordinary irrevocable trust. The assets should be excluded from the grantor’s gross estate at death, as the grantor presumably will have retained no rights or powers under Section 2036 or 2038.32 Of course, if the special power is exercised to distribute the assets outright to the grantor, then the assets will be included in his or her gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes.

The trust can be structured as a grantor trust or nongrantor trust. If structured as a grantor trust, and the grantor wishes to turn off grantor trust status, then he or she can relinquish whatever powers render it a grantor trust. These options give the grantor significant flexibility.

One careful consideration is ensuring there always will be someone who holds the special power that can be exercised in the grantor’s favor. Default powerholders might include siblings or cousins, for example, but allow the trustee to strip the power from any person who succeeds to the power. Also, it may be wise to provide that the powerholder needs the consent of some nonadverse party such as a partner in the law firm that has represented the grantor.

Potential Disadvantages of a SPAT Arrangement
The IRS could argue that there was an implied or express understanding at the time of the trust creation that the powerholder would exercise the power in favor of the grantor. This, of course, would have the negative consequence of triggering Section 2036, and therefore thwart any estate tax planning objective.33

The grantor’s creditors might argue that the SPAT should be treated as if it were a self-settled trust. The grantor’s defense would be that there is a significant distinction between the two: Whereas the trustee in the case of a DAPT is under a fiduciary duty, the powerholder in the case of a SPAT is not. For example, in Iannotti v. Commissioner of New York State Dept. of Health,34 a trust protector had the power to amend the trust and thereby make the grantor a beneficiary. Based on this power, the court ruled that the grantor’s creditors could reach the trust’s assets. Note, however, that the trust protector was subject to a fiduciary duty.

If the special powerholder does indeed appoint the assets back to the grantor, and the transfer was a completed gift, then the grantor’s exclusion would have been wasted and the assets would be back in his or her estate. In addition, if asset protection was the goal, then that purpose will have been thwarted because the assets would then be available to the grantor’s creditors. It may be anticipated that the escape hatch would be used only if the grantor actually needed the assets that is, he or she would spend the money; alternatively, someone to whom the assets are distributed would acquire assets for the use of the grantor. The SPAT trust should really be viewed as a means of last resort for the grantor as is a DAPT. If the special powerholder appoints the assets to a trust for the grantor, instead of outright, then the resulting trust might be considered a self-settled trust, which is what the grantor presumably wanted to avoid in the first place. As a matter of common law, the special powerholder is not treated as owning the trust property and is not treated as the transferor but merely as the agent of the original transferor (i.e., the grantor of the original trust).35 The law seems uncertain on whether the trust created by the exercise for the benefit of the grantor of the power over the trust which the grantor created is treated as self-settled for creditor purposes.

The special powerholder needs to beware of triggering the Delaware Tax Trap. If the holder exercises the power to create another power that may postpone vesting or suspend absolute ownership for a period not ascertainable without reference to the date that the trust was created, then the assets will be subject to estate tax in the powerholder’s estate or cause the powerholder to be deemed to have made a gift.36 The trust can avoid this result by limiting the exercise so that any creation of another power cannot trigger the Trap. Then again, some practitioners intentionally trigger the Trap to use the otherwise unused gift or estate exemption of the powerholder or to obtain a change in tax basis under Section 1014, in which case the trust should not include such limiting language, but the powerholder needs to be aware of the issue.37

Lastly, there always is a chance that the special powerholder could exercise the power in favor of someone else in a manner not really intended by the grantor. For example, if the power permits the appointment of any descendants of the grantor’s grandparents, the powerholder may exercise the power in favor of the grantor’s sibling or cousin, much to the grantor’s dismay, although the power could be made exercisable only with the consent of a third party, such as the grantor’s legal counsel, as mentioned above.

An Analogy to ING Trusts
For years, practitioners have assisted clients in the creation of incomplete nongrantor trusts, created in asset jurisdictions such as Alaska, Delaware, and Nevada.38 The purpose of these “ING” trusts generally is to attempt to avoid state income tax on assets held in trust, which otherwise would be taxed to the grantor who lives in a locale with state income tax. There are several analogies that exist between ING trusts and SPATs.

One of the key ingredients to ING trusts is the existence of a “distribution committee,” or “power of appointment committee,” which is a group consisting of at least two individuals other than the grantor to whom the committee may direct the trustee to make distributions. In these trusts, the trustee has no discretion to distribute income or principal during the grantor’s lifetime. Instead, distributions by the trustee are made only at the unanimous direction of the distribution committee or with the grantor and one other member of the distribution committee. The distribution committee can direct distributions to its own members. The members of the distribution committee act in a nonfiduciary capacity.

Although there is no “special power” or language that the distribution committee cannot appoint to themselves, the predominant theory is that the members of the distribution committee do not possess a general power of appointment, and that the decision to direct the trustee to make distributions was not a gift for federal gift tax purposes by any of them. If a person has a power of appointment that is exercisable only in conjunction with the creator of the power, then that power is not a general power of appointment.39 Because there is no general power of appointment, there is no gift by a member of the distribution committee incurred by exercising the power of a committee member.

The role of the distribution committee in ING trusts is similar to the role of the special powerholder SPATs. The special powerholder holds the power in a nonfiduciary capacity. The difference is that the distribution committee members can cause distributions to themselves. In contrast, the SPAT powerholder cannot exercise the power in favor of himself or herself.

The ING trust generally is structured as an incomplete gift for federal gift tax purposes. There are two powers of an ING trust that, when combined, give comfort that the gift to the trust is incomplete:

1. The grantor retains a testamentary special power of appointment.
2. The lifetime distribution power that is held by the grantor together with a member of the distribution committee.40

As discussed above, like an ING trust, the grantor of a SPAT can render the transfer to the trust an incomplete gift by retaining a special testamentary power of appointment. Unlike an ING, in which the grantor, by joining with a member of the distribution committee, can direct distributions, the grantor does not have any ability to affect the special power.

Each of the private letter rulings “approving” ING trusts involved trusts established in DAPT jurisdictions. The reason is that a trust is a grantor trust if the trust assets are subject to the claims of the grantor’s creditors. Although, as expressed earlier, a SPAT should not be subject to the claims of the grantor’s creditors as it is not a self-settled trust (as no trustee holds the discretionary to make distributions to or for the grantor), it makes sense to consider creating any SPAT in a DAPT jurisdiction.

Generation-Skipping Transfer Issues
Assuming the transfer to the SPAT is structured as a completed gift, generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax exemption probably should not be allocated to this type of trust. If the special power is exercised in favor of the grantor, then the GST exemption allocated to the trust is wasted.


“ Assuming the transfer to the SPAT is structured as a completed gift, generation skipping transfer (GST) tax exemption probably should not be allocated to this type of trust.”


Special care should be taken not to trigger the automatic GST allocation rules under Section 2632. If the trust would qualify as a GST trust under Section 2632(c)(3)(B), then the grantor needs to opt out of automatic allocation of the GST exemption on his or her federal gift tax return, as permitted under Section 2632(6)(3). Moreover, if the Delaware Tax Trap accidentally is triggered (despite the warning above), then the powerholder becomes the new transferor for GST purposes and the grantor’s GST exemption is wasted.41

Conclusion
The SPAT essentially is a more conservative version of a self-settled trust. As such, it offers much of the benefits of self-settled trusts. The SPAT is a potential solution for grantors who want to take advantage of the temporary increase in applicable exclusion, but do not have so much wealth that they are certain they will never need the assets again. The SPAT seems to create more asset protection for the grantor than a mere a self-settled trust.

Citations

 

1 Note, also, that, regardless of what state law is involved, under U.S. Bankruptcy Code section 548(e), assets transferred to a self-settled trust or similar device may be avoided in a bankruptcy proceeding if the transfer was made within ten years of the filing of the bankruptcy proceeding and made with an actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.
2 See discussion in Roman, “Protecting Your Clients’ Assets From Their Future Ex-Sons and Daughters-in-Law: The Impact of Evolving Laws on Alimony Awards,” 39 ACTEC J. 157 (Spring/Fall 2013).
3 The U.S. has made itself a “super” creditor in some respects. See the discussion under “Stronger Asset Protection for Trust Beneficiaries” contained in Blattmachr, Chapman, Gans, and Shaftel, “New Alaska Law Will Enhance Nationwide Estate Planning-Part 1,” 40 ETPL 3 (September 2013).
4 In New York, as a general rule, 90% of a distribution from a spendthrift trust is exempt from creditors. NY CPLR section 5205. Under an exception, creditors may be permitted greater access if it is shown that the distribution is not needed for the reasonable requirements of the beneficiary and his or her dependents. Id.
5 AS 34.40.110.
6 See Shaftel, ed., Eleventh Annual ACTEC Comparison of the Domestic Asset Protection Trust Statutes Updated Through August 2017.
7 See e.g., AS 34.40.110(i) (stating that “[a]n agreement or understanding, express or implied, between the settlor and the trustee that attempts to grant or permit the retention of greater rights or authority than is stated in the trust instrument is void”).
8 But see discussion in Blattmachr and Blattmachr, “Avoiding the Adverse Effects of Huber,” 152 Trusts & Estates 7 (July 2013).
9 See generally Shaftel, supra note 6.
10 See Toni 1 Trust v. Wacker, 413 P.3d 1199 (Alaska 2018)).
11 See, e.g., Riechers v. Riechers. 267 A.D.2d 445 (N.Y 2nd Dept. 1999).
12 See. e.g., Ltr. Rul. 200944002 (not precedent under Section 6110(k)); also see Paxton. 86 TC 785; also for a full discussion, see Portfolio 810-3rd: Asset Protection Planning, Detailed Analysis, BNA Tax Management Portfolios.
13 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 60. Comment f; Restatement {Third} of Trusts § 58. Paragraph 2; UTC § 505(2).
14 New York EPTL 7-3.1(a) (“A disposition in trust for the use of the creator is void as against the existing or subsequent creditors of the creator.”).
15 Cf. In Re Huber, 201 B.R. 685 (Bkrptcy DC WA 2013)
16 See In Re Huber, supra note 15.
17 See Akers, Blattmachr, and Boyle, “Creating Intentional Grantor Trusts,” 44 Real Property, Trust and Estate Law J. 207 (Summer 2009).
18 Reg. 1.676(a)-1.
19 Sections 677(a)(1) and (2).
20 Section 672(a). Section 672 provides a definition of adverse party.
21 Section 673.
22 See Blattmachr and Lipkind, “Fundamentals of DING Type Trusts: No Gift Not a Grantor Trust,” 26 Probate Practice Reporter 1 (April 2014).
23 Section 675(4)(C).
24 Sections 671 through 679.
25 Reg. 25.2511-2(b); see also Zeydel, “When Is a Gift to a Trust Complete: Did CCA 201208026 Get it Right?,” 117 J. Tax’n 142 (September 2012).
26 Reg. 25.2511-2(b)
27 Reg. 25.2511-2(f).
28 83 TC 1 (1984).
29 See Sections 2041 and 2514; New York EPTL 10-7.2.
30 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 3(4).
31 Restatement (Third) of Trusts§ 48. See, e.g., Fla. Statutes§ 736.0103(4) (“An interest as a permissible appointee of a power of appointment, held by a person in a capacity other than that of a trustee, is not a beneficial inter est.... “).
32 See Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-2 CB 7.
33 See Ur. Rul. 9141027 (not precedent).
34 283 A.D.2d 645, 725 N.Y.S.2d 866 (2001).
35 See discussion in Self, 135 Ct. Cl. 371, 142 F. Supp. 929 (1956), also cited in Estate of Regester, 83 TC 1 (1984)
36 Sections 2041(a)(3) and 2514(d).
37 See discussion in Blattmachr and Rivlin, “Searching for Basis in Estate Planning: Less Tax for Heirs,” 41 ETPL 3 (August 2014).
38 See Blattmachr and Lipkind, supra note 22.
39 Section 2514(c)( 3)(A); also see Blattmachr and Lipkind, supra note 22.
40 Id. (citing Estate of Sanford, 308 U.S.39 (1939)).
41 See Portfolio 825-4th Powers of Appointment-Estate, Gift, and Income Tax Considerations, BNA Tax Management Portfolios.

Private Placement Life Insurance (PPLI) :
A Strategic Tool for Estate Planning & Advanced Tax Strategies

 

Introduction to Private Placement Life Insurance (PPLI)

By William D. Lipkind, Matthew D. Blattmachr, and Jonathan G. Blattmachr

An Overview of PPLI
Private Placement Life Insurance (PPLI) is an advanced financial product that merges the protective features of traditional life insurance with the flexibility of private investment accounts. It’s specifically designed to meet the complex needs of high-net-worth clients, offering significant tax advantages while facilitating sophisticated estate planning and wealth management strategies.


“Private Placement Life Insurance (PPLI) is an advanced financial product that merges the protective features of traditional life insurance with the flexibility of private investment accounts.”


Relevance to Estate Planning and Tax Advisors
For estate planning attorneys and financial advisors, PPLI represents a powerful tool in the arsenal of advanced tax planning. Its ability to offer tax-deferred growth and shield assets from estate taxes makes it a compelling option for clients seeking to preserve and grow their wealth across generations.

 

Key Tax Benefits of PPLI

Tax-Deferred Growth: A Core Advantage
At the heart of PPLI’s appeal is its capacity to allow investments within the policy to grow without incurring annual taxes. This tax-deferred growth is particularly advantageous for clients looking to optimize their wealth over the long term. Compared to traditional investment vehicles, the tax efficiency of PPLI can significantly enhance the net returns on investment, making it an essential consideration in advanced tax planning.

Tax-Free Access to Cash Values
PPLI policies provide the flexibility to access the accumulated cash value through loans or withdrawals, typically without triggering immediate tax liabilities. Under Sections 7702 and 7702A of the Internal Revenue Code, these transactions can remain tax-free, provided the policy adheres to IRS guidelines. This feature is especially valuable for clients needing liquidity while minimizing taxable events, a common scenario in sophisticated estate planning.

 

Legal Framework Governing PPLI

IRS Code Sections 7702 & 7702A: The Foundation of PPLI
Sections 7702 and 7702A are critical to understanding how PPLI qualifies as life insurance for tax purposes. These sections establish the tests—such as the guideline premium test and the cash value accumulation test—that a policy must meet to receive favorable tax treatment. Compliance with these rules ensures that the policy’s death benefits and cash value growth remain tax-advantaged.

The Implications of Modified Endowment Contracts (MECs)
A policy classified as a Modified Endowment Contract (MEC) under Section 7702A loses some of the favorable tax treatments typically associated with life insurance. For instance, loans and withdrawals from MECs are taxed on a “last-in, first-out” (LIFO) basis, where earnings are withdrawn first and taxed accordingly. Understanding these distinctions is crucial for advisors structuring PPLI policies to maximize tax benefits and avoid unintended tax consequences for their clients. A modified endowment policy is one where the premiums are paid more rapidly than specified in the Code, such as a single premium policy.

Understanding the Investor Control Doctrine
The IRS’s Investor Control Doctrine plays a pivotal role in the taxation of PPLI policies. This doctrine posits that if a policyholder exerts excessive control over the investments within a PPLI, the IRS may deem the policyholder the owner of the underlying assets, thereby subjecting the earnings to immediate taxation.


“To prevent the adverse tax implications of the Investor Control Doctrine, estate planners and financial advisors must structure PPLI policies to limit the policyholder’s direct influence over investment decisions.”


This principle is particularly relevant in the context of private placements, where investment choices are typically broader and more complex.

Strategies to Mitigate Investor Control Risks
To prevent the adverse tax implications of the Investor Control Doctrine, estate planners and financial advisors must structure PPLI policies to limit the policyholder’s direct influence over investment decisions. Utilizing insurance-dedicated funds managed by independent third-party managers (over whom the policy owner does not exercise control) is a common strategy. This approach ensures compliance with the IRS guidelines while allowing clients to benefit from the tax-deferred growth inherent in PPLI.

 

Strategic Considerations for Using PPLI

Maximizing Investment Flexibility Within PPLI
PPLI policies offer unparalleled investment flexibility, enabling clients to allocate premiums to a wide range of assets, including equities, bonds, hedge funds, and private equity although Section 817 requires adequate diversification of investments (e.g., not more than 55% of the assets can be in more than one investment). This flexibility allows for the customization of portfolios to align with specific financial objectives while leveraging the tax benefits of life insurance. For advisors, understanding the intricacies of these investment options is key to structuring a PPLI policy that meets the unique needs of each client.

Asset Protection: An Added Layer of Security
In addition to tax benefits, PPLI provides substantial asset protection advantages. In many jurisdictions, the assets within a PPLI policy are shielded from creditors, offering clients a secure means of preserving wealth. This feature is particularly relevant in estate planning, where the protection of assets from potential claims can be as important as minimizing tax liabilities.

Enhancing Estate Planning Through PPLI
PPLI is a versatile tool in estate planning, offering tax-free death benefits that, together with other arrangements, can significantly reduce the burden of estate taxes. By incorporating PPLI into a broader estate plan, advisors can help clients efficiently transfer wealth to the next generation while addressing liquidity needs. For example, the death benefit from a PPLI policy can be used to cover estate taxes, preventing the forced sale of other assets.

Caveat: Proposed Changes to Tax Law
President Biden’s tax proposals for fiscal year 2025, as reflected in the Green Book issued by the Department of the Treasury on March 11, 2024, would have all distributions from most PPLI policies taxed as ordinary income, to the extent of the income of the policy, regardless of whether such distributions occurred as a loan or a death benefit.

In addition, it would eliminate the estate tax death benefit for such policies. This provision would not be applicable to existing policies that were not subsequently modified. Vice President Harris has, as part of her campaign for the Presidency, adopted, inter alia, these proposals. Considering these tax proposals, for individuals considering PPLI, it would be prudent to undertake the strategy in 2024 so as not to risk tax changes in 2025.

 

Conclusion

Harnessing PPLI for Advanced Tax and Estate Planning
For estate planning attorneys and financial advisors, PPLI is more than just a life insurance product—it’s a strategic solution that addresses complex tax and estate planning challenges. By combining the tax-deferral advantages of


“For estate planning attorneys and financial advisors, PPLI is more than just a life insurance product—it’s a strategic solution that addresses complex tax and estate planning challenges.”


life insurance with the flexibility of private placements, PPLI enables high-net-worth clients to optimize their wealth management strategies. While the nuances of PPLI require careful structuring and expert guidance, the benefits make it an indispensable tool in the sophisticated advisor’s toolkit.

If you have more questions about Private Placement Life Insurance, get in touch with a trust officer at Peak Trust Company today!

Charitable Remainder Trusts & IRAs

A Strategy for Taxation of Retirement Assets after Loss of “Stretch”

By Matthew D. Blattmachr, CFP® Jonathan G. Blattmachr, JD, LLM, & Amber Gunn, CTFA

In some cases, it is beneficial for distributions from a qualified (pension) plan or an IRA to be paid over a rela- tively long period of time. One reason is that the longer assets are left inside such a plan or account, the more time they have to grow tax-deferred.


"After the changes to the Internal Revenue Code made by the SECURE Act, there is a substantially reduced time that the income taxation of assets in a plan or IRA can be postponed once the plan participant or IRA owner dies.”


After the changes to the Internal Revenue Code made by the SECURE Act, there is a substantially reduced time that the income taxation of assets in a plan or IRA can be postponed once the plan participant or IRA owner dies. (Special rules apply to what are called Roth IRAs which are not addressed in this article).

After the SECURE Act, long-term income tax deferral remains unchanged for select beneficiaries such as a surviving spouse, a minor child of the participant or owner, a disabled person, a person who is chronically ill, or someone who is not more than ten years younger than the participant or owner. All others, however, must take out the entire amount in the plan or IRA within ten years (or, in some cases, five years).

The options can be complicated when deciding the best way to continue to postpone taxation of interests in plans or IRAs; however, one strategy is to make use of a charitable remainder trust.

 

An Answer for Some: A Charitable Remainder Trust

A charitable remainder trust (CRT) is a trust where one or more individuals receive benefits for life or a fixed term (of not more than 20 years) and then the remaining property in the trust passes to charity. Both the Internal Revenue Code and regulations have detailed rules about CRTs. Generally, these trusts have been used to postpone taxation. For example, if a taxpayer decides to sell appreciated stock, the shares instead can be contributed to a CRT and the trust can then sell them without any tax because the trust is exempt from income tax.

Distributions from the trust are included in the recipient’s income under somewhat complex rules. Because a CRT is income tax-exempt, proceeds from a qualified plan or IRA can be paid to the trust when the participant or owner dies and no income tax will then be payable. However, as the plan or IRA proceeds are distributed out of the CRT, they will be taxed to the recipient.

 

A Special Kind of CRT: The NIMCRUT

The rules related to CRTs are complicated. One of the complications is choosing what kind of CRT to use. There are three types of CRT. One type, called a charitable remainder annuity trust (CRAT), pays a fixed amount (an annuity) each year to the beneficiary or beneficiaries. Actuarial rules limit how much of an annuity and for how long the CRAT can pay.

The second type, called a charitable remainder unitrust (CRUT), pays an annual amount equal to a fixed percentage of the annual value of the trust. If the trust grows in value, the beneficiaries receive more. If the trust declines in value, they will receive less. Actuarial rules also limit how much of a unitrust amount can be paid and for how long, but there is greater flexibility with a unitrust than with an annuity trust.

The third type is the most complicated but may offer the best results. It pays the lesser of either the unitrust amount or the “fiduciary accounting income” (“FAI” or simply “Trust Income”). This type of CRT is sometimes called a “Net Income” CRT. Trust Income is itself a complicated topic. Generally, it means income (as opposed to principal or corpus) under state law rules relating to trusts. Trust Income usually consists of dividends and interest and normally not capital gains, however, there are exceptions that a taxpayer may use to produce a better result.

With this third type, the law allows for amounts to be “made up” or paid in future years. For example, if Trust In- come is lower than the unitrust payment, the annual payment can be postponed until a year when Trust Income is greater than the unitrust amount. This type of CRT is sometimes called a “Net Income with Make-up Charitable Remainder Unitrust” or “NIMCRUT".

 

Why a NIMCRUT May Help with Plan and IRA Proceeds

Making plan or IRA proceeds payable at death to a CRT means they must be paid out within five years of the death of the participant or owner, however, there is no adverse income tax due to the CRT’s tax exemption. The CRT would invest the proceeds and, even if a NIMCRUT is used, Trust Income (such as a dividend or interest) would be earned and would have to be distributed to and taxed to the trust beneficiary, however, by “sandwiching” an entity, such as a limited liability company or LLC, between the CRT and the assets it invests in, Trust Income can be kept at zero. If and when it is desirable to generate Trust Income, the entity (that is, the LLC) can voluntarily make a distribution to the NIMCRUT which will then make distributions to the beneficiary for the unitrust amount for that year and for shortfalls in prior years.

As long as no Trust Income is generated (because the LLC makes no distributions), the value of the trust can grow entirely free of income tax. In fact, a NIMCRUT can provide for a yearly unitrust payment of 11% for 20 years. It will be noted that if the LLC (and thereby the trust) grows over time, the 11% will apply to ever-increasing amounts meaning more will be accruing for the beneficiary. If the LLC makes no distributions until the 20th year, no income tax will be due regardless of how much the LLC earns. If the beneficiary is under the age of 30, the payments can be made for the life of the beneficiary, but payments will usually be under 11% a year.

A limitation to keep in mind is that to have a valid CRT, the value of the remainder in the trust for charity must be at least 10% of the value of the assets when they are first transferred to the trust. That does not mean that the charity must receive 10% of what is in the trust when it ends. In fact, with the current low interest rates the IRS uses, the amount a charity receives at the end may be a very small percentage of what is in the trust when it ends.

 

Key Considerations for Drafting a CRT

The IRS has issued sample forms for CRTs which, if used, practically guarantees a valid CRT; however, these IRS forms can be modified to ensure a better result. It will almost always be best to have the value of the remainder when the CRT is created to be the minimum required, which is 10%. As indicated, the best benefit of a CRT is its exemption from income taxation. That exemption is available whether the remainder is 10% or greater. Since the family member of the participant or owner benefits from this exemption and loses the benefit to the extent the trust goes to charity, it usually is best to keep the charitable remainder value at 10% and not more. Those drafting a CRT may consider the included sample provisions to obtain this result.

Sample Language

Unitrust Amount. The Unitrust Amount shall be the lesser of: (i) the trust income for the taxable year (Trust Income), as defined in Internal Revenue Code Sec. 643(b) and the Regulations thereunder, and (ii) the “Unitrust Percentage Amount,” which shall be equal to the largest percentage, paid with the frequency provided below and using the highest rate published by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to Internal Revenue Code Sec. 7520 that may be used to determine the value of the remainder of this trust under Internal Revenue Code Sec. 664(d)(2)(D), which percentage is not less than five percent (5%) and not greater than fifty percent (50%) of the net fair market value of the assets of the trust valued as of the first business day of each taxable year (the “valuation date”) rounded to the nearest one one-thousandths of one percent, paid for the term and at the manner specified above, such that the value of the remainder within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code Sec. 664(d)(2)(D) of this charitable remainder trust as of the date this trust commences shall be ten percent (10%) or, if it is not mathematically possible for the remainder to equal ten percent (10%), as mathematically close to but greater than ten percent (10%) as possible.


The LLC and Trust Income

In order to provide the greatest flexibility to produce as much or as little Trust Income as possible, the NIMCRUT should be funded with an LLC or similar entity. However, none of the trustees, the grantor of the trust, or any beneficiary of the trust can determine when distributions from the LLC may be made to the trust. However, some independent person, such as legal counsel to the grantor, can be given the power to control distributions from the LLC, by naming that person as a “non-member manager” of the LLC. That means that the person will have no ownership interest in the LLC and the LLC can be a “disregarded entity” for income tax purposes so its income will be attributed to the NIMCRUT, which being tax-exempt will owe no income tax on the income earned by the LLC. The included provision may be considered to obtain this result.

Sample Language

Limitation on Determination of Income.The determination of what is and is not Trust Income of this trust shall be made under Alaska law. In addition, the following rules shall apply: (1) proceeds from the sale or exchange of any assets contributed to the Charitable Remainder Trust herein created must be allocated to the principal and not to Trust Income, at least to the extent of the fair market value of those assets on the date of contribution, (2) proceeds of any sale or exchange of any asset purchased by the Charitable Remainder Trust herein created must be allocated to the principal and not to Trust Income, at least to the extent of the Trust’s purchase price of those assets, and (3) Trust Income may not be determined by reference to a fixed percentage of the annual fair market value of the trust property, notwithstanding any contrary provision and applicable state law.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the following rules shall apply except to the extent but only to the extent that they depart fundamentally from traditional principles of income and principal within the meaning of Treas. Reg. 1.643(b)-1. The trust will not be deemed to have any Trust Income merely by the imputation of tax income to the trust from an entity, such as a limited liability company or a partnership, whether it is owed in whole or in part by the trust or of which the trust is a partner or member. Any cash distribution from such an entity shall be considered Trust Income except to the extent the entity advises the trust it constitutes a liquidating distribution.


Creating and Funding the Trust

It likely will be best if the NIMCRUT is created and funded with an entity, such as an LLC, prior to the death of the plan participant or IRA owner. The LLC (or other entity) may be named as the beneficiary of the plan or IRA. This way, the proceeds can be paid from the plan or IRA to the entity soon after the death of the participant or owner. The entire plan or IRA must be paid within five years of the death of the owner or participant.

Although the entity will be deemed to receive taxable income from the distributions, this income will be imputed to the NIMCRUT which is income tax exempt. In many cases, this may prove ultimately beneficial. For example, all distributions from a plan or IRA are taxed as ordinary income, but distributions from a CRT follow a more favorable tax regime. If capital gain income is earned in the plan or IRA after the death of the participant or owner, it will be treated and taxed as ordinary income. But, if the entity (LLC) receives qualified dividends, long-term capital gain or other income which is more favorably taxed than ordinary income, this better character or flavor of the income will be retained when and if paid out to the NIMCRUT beneficiary.

 

If you have more questions about Charitable Remainder Trusts & IRAs, get in touch with a trust officer at Peak Trust Company today!

Nevada Trust Decanting: A Solution for Modifying Irrevocable Trusts

By Jay R. Larsen, Esq.

Irrevocable trusts are a common tool in estate planning. They play an important role in protecting assets, reducing taxes, and preserving legacies from one generation to the next. Irrevocable trusts come into existence in a number of ways.

A grantor who created a typical revocable living trust may die, at which point the trust becomes irrevocable. Or perhaps the grantor created an irrevocable trust to protect assets or remove a large life insurance policy from the grantor/insured’s estate for estate tax purposes. The grantors may have grandchildren for whom they wish to establish an irrevocable minor’s trust for future education.


“There are many reasons for using irrevocable trusts, but a common
characteristic is that they are typically not amendable.”


There are many reasons for using irrevocable trusts, but a common characteristic is that they are typically not amendable. A carefully drafted irrevocable trust may provide some flexibility, for example through a limited power of appointment. But generally speaking, an irrevocable trust that has “gone wrong” in some way can be difficult to change.

 

Why Might You Want to Change the Trust?

Rather than things going wrong with the trust, it is more likely that goals or circumstances change such that it is difficult to accomplish the original intent of the trust. Sometimes issues arise with trust assets or beneficiaries, and the trust language is too ambiguous to provide clear direction about what should be done.

Maybe circumstances arise which cause the parties involved to recognize the benefits of extending the trust beyond a fixed term or mandatory payout at a certain age. Changing a trust from one that provides for the health, education, support and maintenance needs of a beneficiary to a discretionary trust can provide superior asset protection. Perhaps it makes sense to combine trusts that otherwise cannot be merged by their terms. Or due to the differing needs of a pool of beneficiaries of a single large pot trust, it might make sense to divide the trust into separate trusts. Perhaps tax laws change.

In addition to the reasons above, there are many others for wanting to modify an otherwise seemingly unchangeable irrevocable trust. So how does one go about accomplishing that objective?

 

How to “Fix” the Irrevocable Trust.

  • Court Order: One possible method of dealing with desired changes is to petition the court. This works well to fix clerical errors, confirm new trustees, or clarify ambiguities. However, certain modifications, such as changing distribution provisions, may be more difficult, especially without the consent of all the beneficiaries affected by the change.
  • Non-Judicial Settlement Agreement: If beneficiary consent is going to be needed anyway, a non-judicial settlement agreement (“NJSA”) should be considered if your state allows it. Nevada statute permits a wide range of changes to an irrevocable trust, including its termination. NRS 164.940.
  • Decanting: A third option for fixing potential problems with irrevocable trusts is for the trustee to transfer assets from the irrevocable trust causing the concern to a new irrevocable trust that does not have the problems. This transferring process is known as “decanting.” Not all trusts are eligible for decanting and not all states allow decanting. Fortunately, Nevada statute allows for decanting as long as the statutory requirements are met. NRS 163.556.

The Decanting Process

First, the irrevocable trust should be domiciled in Nevada and subject to Nevada law. If necessary, jurisdiction of the trust should be transferred to Nevada so that the Nevada decanting statutes apply.


“As you can imagine, in order to prevent a trustee from abusing the decanting power, there are additional restrictions to decanting if the trustee is also a beneficiary of the first irrevocable trust.”


Next, the trustee must satisfactorily answer several questions. Do the terms of the trust prevent decanting? If so, the trust may not be decanted. Does the trustee have discretion or authority to distribute income or principal of the trust either to or for the benefit of a beneficiary? If so, then the property which is subject to the discretion or authority may be transferred to a second irrevocable trust.

It is important to note that new beneficiaries may not be added to the second trust. Also, there are several circumstances under which decanting is not allowed. Such circumstances include the second trust reducing an income interest if the first trust is a marital trust, a charitable trust, or grantor retained annuity trust. Or if property specifically allocated to a particular beneficiary is not allocated to that same beneficiary in the second trust, unless the beneficiary consents. There are also a couple of other prohibited situations.

As you can imagine, in order to prevent a trustee from abusing the decanting power, there are additional restrictions to decanting if the trustee is also a beneficiary of the first irrevocable trust.

Once it is determined that the trustee may decant assets from the first irrevocable trust to the second, the next step is to create the second irrevocable trust, if it is not already established.

Before appointing assets to the second trust, the trustee may give notice to the beneficiaries or may seek court approval. The statute is not clear whether or not the trustee may decant without either notice or court approval, but arguably should be okay. Nevertheless, the recommended course of action is to either obtain beneficiary consent, provide the appropriate notice, or obtain court approval. If court approval is sought, notice of the petition is given to the beneficiaries.

After court approval is obtained, the notice period expires, or beneficiary consent is obtained, the trustee may assign the desired assets from the first trust to the second trust.

Decanting has become an additional tool to remedy “broken” trusts, whether from drafting problems or from changed life circumstances. However, proper decanting is not a do-it-yourself project. Working with an experienced trust company serving as trustee and receiving the advice of experienced legal counsel is important for successful trust decanting.

Special Needs Trusts: Ensuring Financial Security for Individuals with Disabilities

By Mariam Hall, CFMP & Amber Gunn-Holt, CTFA

A special needs trust (SNT) is a privately and professionally managed trust set up by one or more persons, called grantors, for the benefit of a person with disabilities or other impairments. An SNT is administered and managed by a trustee. Ideally, this trustee is an experienced professional fiduciary, such as a trust company. In addition to being created by individual grantors, SNTs can be formed from litigation proceeds payable to a disabled beneficiary, including lump sums and annuity payments. If drafted and administered properly, an SNT can supplement government benefits, such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Medicaid and will not disqualify the beneficiary from receiving means-tested government benefits.

 


“A Special Needs Trust (“SNT”) is a privately and professionally managed
trust set up by one or more persons, called grantors, for the benefit of a person with disabilities or other impairments.”


 

Considerations for Creating Special Needs Trusts

SNTs are powerful tools that enable individuals with disabilities to maintain eligibility for government benefits while also receiving financial support from the trust. When creating an SNT, it is essential to carefully consider various factors to ensure the trust is structured and funded appropriately and that it effectively meets the beneficiary’s unique needs. Critical factors include:

  • Maintaining government benefits eligibility
  • Providing clear guidance in a letter of intent to ensure the best care for the beneficiary
  • Selecting a qualified trustee who can administer the trust without a conflict of interest

Government Benefits Eligibility

When creating an SNT, it is essential to consider whether the beneficiary’s assets and other resources will likely cover the full cost of their lifetime needs or whether government benefits will also be needed to help cover such needs. This assessment will help determine the appropriate structure and funding of the SNT. It is important to note that even if a beneficiary does not financially need to rely on Medicaid for health insurance or on SSI for monthly payments, he or she may still need to be “Medicaid-eligible” to participate in beneficial state or local programs, such as life skills training. Working with an estate or Medicaid planning professional can help estimate the beneficiary’s future expenses and identify programs for which they may be eligible.

Understanding the differences among Medicare, Medicaid, SSI, and Social Security Disability Income (SSDI) is crucial when setting up an SNT. A special needs beneficiary may benefit from all four programs, each with eligibility rules and covered services. SSDI and Medicare are not based on financial need, while SSI and Medicaid have strict financial requirements. Comprehending the eligibility requirements of the particular programs for which the beneficiary qualifies or is likely to qualify for in the future is critical.

When establishing an SNT, reviewing all assets and beneficiary designations is crucial to ensure that no funds or resources pass directly to the beneficiary. All the beneficiary’s inherited property shares should pass directly to the SNT. SSI, Medicaid, and other means-tested government benefits could be lost if assets pass outright to the beneficiary.

This review should include:

  • IRA, 401(k), and other retirement benefits.
  • Life insurance.
  • Employer-provided death benefits.
  • Annuities and savings bonds.

It is worth noting that trusts can be drafted to contain an SNT provision that is activated if a beneficiary’s life circumstances change. This flexibility ensures that the trust can adapt to the beneficiary’s evolving needs and maintain their eligibility for essential government benefits.

 

Letter of Intent

Providing a letter of intent to assist the SNT trustee is highly recommended. This letter provides valuable information concerning the beneficiary’s daily life, health care concerns, likes, dislikes, needs, preferences, and other important details. It is especially helpful when a new caregiver steps in to manage day-to-day activities. Once the SNT has been created, the letter of intent should be regularly updated to document any changes in care requirements, ensuring the best care for the beneficiary.

 

Trustee Selection

Selecting a qualified trustee is a critical consideration when creating an SNT. During the initial stages, a trustee will be chosen to administer and manage the trust assets for the sole and exclusive benefit of the beneficiary. Performing the duties of a trustee is a serious responsibility. The trustee must understand the trust terms, appropriately manage the trust assets, and properly apply the trust funds without disqualifying the beneficiary from government benefits. Most importantly, the trustee must be able to fulfill their fiduciary duties, including maintaining undivided loyalty to the beneficiary.


“As you can imagine, in order to prevent a trustee from abusing the decanting power, there are additional restrictions to decanting if the trustee is also a beneficiary of the first irrevocable trust.”


SNT Trustee Duties

  • Invest the assets of an SNT to reflect the needs, risk tolerances, and projected length of care for the beneficiary; risk tolerance tends to be low. SNT funds should be invested to produce an appropriate mix of current income and capital appreciation.
  • Distribute income and principal “for the sole benefit” of the beneficiary, preferably directly to providers of goods and services to avoid misuse of funds or inadvertent impact on government benefits.
  • Reimburse persons who have expended their own funds for items that are permissible SNT disbursements.
  • Coordinate with healthcare professionals to provide for the current and anticipated needs of the beneficiary.
  • Provide accurate accounting, periodic reporting of receipts and disbursements, and periodic and accurate accounting that reflect trust expenditures and receipts.
  • Verify that SNT distributions do not defray a legal obligation of support owed by another to the beneficiary.

Choosing a Trustee

When selecting a trustee for an SNT, it is highly recommended to choose a professional trustee, such as a trust company, due to the specialized skills required to administer the trust properly. Individual trustees are unlikely to afford the high cost of specialized training necessary to manage an SNT effectively.

The chosen trustee must be capable of recognizing and discharging “regular” fiduciary duties, in addition to undertaking an appropriate ongoing analysis of relevant government programs and the impact of trust distributions on the beneficiary’s eligibility for those programs. This requires a deep understanding of the complex rules and regulations surrounding SNTs and government benefits.

Corporate fiduciaries, such as trust companies, are often more cost-effective than individual, non-professional fiduciaries. An individual trustee must separately retain the paid services of investment advisors, accountants, claims processors, bonding agents, and other professionals to effectively manage the SNT. In contrast, corporate fiduciaries typically have these resources and expertise in-house, which permit streamlining the trust administration process and reducing overall costs.

Some states specifically prohibit parents, guardians, or other family members from serving as trustees of an SNT. This is because these individuals are often named as remainder beneficiaries of the trust or are considered heirs-apparent of the beneficiary. Naming a family member as trustee could create conflicts of interest and potentially jeopardize the beneficiary’s
eligibility for government benefits.

For more information on special needs trusts, contact Peak Trust Company today.

Understanding Directed Trusts: Empowering Advisors and Clients

What is a Directed Trust?

In its simplest form, a directed trust is a trust arrangement that effectively relieves the trustee of specific duties, such as investments or distributions, and requires the trustee to act upon the direction of an advisor named in the trust agreement. Directed trusts are often directed as to investments and/or directed as to distributions. For example, with a directed trust that is directed for investments, the trust's terms specify an appointed investment advisor who holds the authority to direct the trustee in all matters related to investments within the trust. The trustee, in this scenario, takes direction for all investment-related actions guided by explicit guidance from the authorized party designated by the trust's terms. This division of responsibilities results in a partnership where the trust company or trustee manages the administrative aspects of the trust, while the client's chosen financial advisor or family advisor maintains control over investment decisions and asset management.

The Rise of Directed Trusts: A Win-Win for Advisors and Clients

The transformation of many trust companies into comprehensive wealth management firms has presented a predicament for financial advisors serving high-net-worth clients. They often find themselves in the awkward position of surrendering control over a portion or the entirety of their clients' assets to a competing entity when recommending the creation of a trust.

Directed trusts offer a solution, allowing the grantor to instruct the trust company to follow the investment directives of an external advisor. In such arrangements, the control over assets, along with the associated investment fees, remains with the advisor, while the trustee assumes the responsibility for trust administration.

In essence, directed trusts align the interests of all parties involved, including grantors and beneficiaries, while minimizing potential conflicts. It's important to note that in directed trusts, someone other than the trustee is responsible for managing the underlying assets. This marks a departure from traditional common law trusts, where the trustee holds responsibility for both property administration and investment decisions.


With a directed trust, control over the assets (and the investment fees they generate) remains with the advisor, while the trustee administers the trust itself.


Directed trusts, as a practice, originated with the Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 1994. Early beneficiaries of these arrangements utilized them to consolidate control over family-held business entities. Since these families possessed a profound understanding of their business operations, directed trusts allowed them to create family LLPs or LLCs and transfer ownership units into the trust. A trust company would act as trustee, while the partnership manager retained control over the enterprise, resulting in a beneficial outcome for all parties involved.

Over the past few decades, the concept of directed trusts has expanded to include more conventional asset classes such as stocks, bonds, cash, and other marketable securities. As before, the legacy advisor, who is most familiar with managing the wealth, continues to oversee investments, while a trust company serves as the trustee, leading to a mutually advantageous setup.

The Directed Trust Company

In the last two decades, a dynamic industry of independent trust companies, such as Peak Trust Company, has emerged as specialized directed trust providers. The best-directed trust companies support open architecture custody platforms, enabling them to manage trust clients' portfolios across a broad range of asset classes, including cash, stocks, individual bonds, mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, and exotic instruments—all in line with the client's directives.

Typically, fees for administration and custody at directed trust companies are approximately half of what comprehensive firms charge for bundled wealth management and trust administration services. Fees in the financial sector can vary significantly, so advisors should explore options on behalf of their clients.

Additionally, the investment manager directing the trust assets retains the authority to set their own management fees and, when appropriate, performance fees. Directed trust companies are often able to avoid additional charges that full-service trust companies may impose for handling complex or illiquid assets since they assume the responsibility and liability for managing such assets.

In conclusion, directed trusts have emerged as a beneficial solution for high-net-worth clients, financial advisors, and trust companies. By separating administrative and investment responsibilities, these trusts create a harmonious environment where all parties can focus on what they do best while ensuring the best interests of the grantors and beneficiaries are upheld. The growth of directed trust companies has further expanded the reach and versatility of this financial strategy, offering more options and cost-effective solutions for clients seeking tailored trust management.

If you have more questions about directed trusts, get in touch with a trust officer at Peak Trust Company today!

Nevada Asset Protection Trust – Just Prudent Planning

Geri Tomich, Esq., discusses Nevada Asset Protection Trust.

 

Nevada is one of the few states, that has a statute that allows the creation of a self-settled spendthrift trust to protect one’s assets from creditors. As a practitioner in this state, I may be biased in saying that Nevada law is superior in the creditor protection arena but many will agree that this bias is not baseless.

In October of 1999, the Nevada State Legislature revised the “Spendthrift Trust Act of Nevada” allowing a person to create a spendthrift trust for the protection of his own assets – hence the term self-settled spendthrift trust. If created and managed correctly, a person can create a trust to which he transfers his personal assets and avail of creditor protection, even when the person is also a beneficiary of the trust. Nevada law also does not prohibit the person from serving as a trustee of the trust but it is very important that the power to make distributions to the person is at the discretion of someone else. This is where the use of professional trustees is highly beneficial.

Nevada has one, if not, the friendliest of the self-settled spendthrift trust laws out there. Mainly because it has the shortest time frame for a creditor to file an action at two years compared to the common four-year window that other states impose. What window?! Under Nevada law, creditors may still file an action against assets transferred into self-settled spendthrift trusts for the first two years of the transfer or six months after a creditor discovers the transfer, whichever is later. In other states, the common time frame is four years.

Another reason why Nevada laws are far more superior than other states is that Nevada self-settled spendthrift trusts are also protected against child and spousal support. Just this year, 2017, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the validity of Nevada self-settled spendthrift trusts as asset protection against child and spousal support obligations. The lower court first ruled that funds from a Nevada self-settled spendthrift trust can be used to pay for the settlor’s child- and spousal-support obligations because, despite the validity of the Nevada self-settled spendthrift trust, there is a strong public policy argument which favors subjecting the interest of the trust beneficiary to claims for child support and alimony. However, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the lower court and ruled that, despite such a strong public policy rationale, Nevada law is clear and explicitly protects Nevada self-settled spendthrift trust assets from the personal obligation of the beneficiary. The Nevada Supreme Court even discussed the legislative history that supports this conclusion. Specifically, the Nevada legislature enacted these laws to make Nevada an attractive place for wealthy individuals to invest their assets. So, despite public policy arguments that are allowed in other states to pierce the protection of a self-settled spendthrift trust, Nevada laws acknowledge that the protection is meant to apply to despite such public policy arguments.

The protective outcome of this case does not, however, apply to child-support or alimony obligations if they are already known at the time the trust was created. Again, advanced planning is key! Create a Nevada self-settled spendthrift trust before threats of financial obligations exist.

To create a Nevada self-settled spendthrift trust, certain requirements must be met:

 

What are the General Requirements?

  • The Trust must be in writing and irrevocable;
  • The Trust must not require the Trust’s income or principal be distributed to the Settlor; and
  • The Trust must not be intended to hinder, delay or defraud known creditors. If you are already being sued, it’s too late.

Who Can Create The Trust?

Anyone can create an asset protection trust under Nevada law so long as there is a Nevada connection. Nevada connection is established if the creator of the trust (“Settlor or Grantor”) is domiciled in the state of Nevada, some of the assets transferred into the trust are located in Nevada, and/or one of the trustees is a Nevada resident of Nevada trust company.

While anyone can utilize the benefits of this trust, persons who are exposed to risk and liability through their profession (e.g. doctors, home builders, attorneys) should seriously consider creating an asset protection trust as soon as possible to have a vehicle to protect their assets from potential personal claims – this is simply part of prudent planning. Remember, when a lawsuit is pending, it is too late.

 

How Are Assets Protected?

As to creditor claims and actions, Nevada statute clearly states that “a person may not bring an action with respect to a transfer of property to a spendthrift trust if the person is a creditor when the transfer is made, unless the action is commenced within: (i) two years after the transfer is made; or (ii) six months after the person discovers or reasonably should have discovered the transfer, whichever is later.” If a person becomes a creditor after the transfer of property is made, that creditor must commence its action within two years after the transfer of property is made into the trust. Thus, any creditor whose claim arises two (2) years after the transfer of property to the Trust is forever excluded from bringing an action to recover assets from the Trust.

Because of the simplicity and ease of creating self-settled spendthrift trusts under Nevada law, creating, and of course funding, said trusts have become a part of any prudent planning used to protect a person’s assets from frivolous lawsuits and potential judgment creditors without the expense and complications of “shipping your money away” off-shore.

 

* Geraldine Tomich, Esq. is a shareholder at Marquis Aurbach Coffing with offices in Reno and Las Vegas, Nevada. She practices in the areas of asset protection, estate planning, probate, guardianships, estate & gift taxation, and business entity formation. Ms. Tomich obtained her masters of law (LL.M.) degree from Thomas Jefferson School of Law from which she graduated magna cum laude. She obtained her juris doctor degree from Gonzaga University School of Law. Ms. Tomich is involved in various community outreach organizations where she volunteers her time. She is a founding director of the Gift Planning Advisors, a Las Vegas group of professionals who provide educational opportunities for planned giving professionals and heighten awareness of donor opportunities. She also sits on the board of Nevada Community Foundation, an officer of the Southern Nevada Estate Planning Council, and a member of the Planned Giving Council of Vegas PBS.

i In Matt Klebacka, Distribution Trustee of the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust dated May 30, 2001 v. Eric L. Nelson, et. al., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 24 (Nev. 2017).